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CHAPTER I
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE WAR
The Spanish American War is usually dismissed with a
few paragraphs in surveys of United states history.l

Its most

lasting title is that of the "Splendid Little War," an epithet
which does not seem to have made it a prime subject for historical research.

Yet, there are certain phases of the war

which can be of definite interest to the historian, especially
if he is interested in discovering more about its aftermath.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the American
Army's organization for logistical supportz first, as it was
at the beginning of the war; second, as i t was during the
operation of Tampa as a port of embarkation: and third, as it
was following the end of the war.
Logistics is a term not normally encountered by the
civilian.

Broadly speaking, logistics is that branch of the

military art which deals with the supply of food and material
to the a rmed forces, their transportation, their medical care,
the rep ai ring of their weapons and equipment, and their housing.
Students of military affairs generally group logistics with
personnel, intelligence, and operations as the essential
functions of an army.

At the beginning of the Spanish-American War, the United
States Army was composed of 28,183 officers and

enli~ted

men.

This force was scattered throughout the country in small detachments, and the supply system of the Army was organized to deal
with it on a small-scale basis. 2
The President of the United States was the commander-inchief of all of the armed forces of the nation.

His wishes in

regard to the Army were carried out by his Secretary of War, R.
A. Alger.

The military officer at the top of the Army's organi-

zation was the Commanding General, Nelson Miles.

The relation-

ship between these two men was the result of the fact that no
one had ever specified what the duties and responsibilities of
their respective offices entailed.

This was not a new situation,

since every secretary and commanding general since the Civil War
had had to deal with it.

However, none of these predecessors

had succeeded in solving it, despite long and acrimonious debates and numerous jurisdictional wrangles.

Both men could, and

did, issue orders to subordinate commanders, but the staff departments in Washington were not under the control of the
Commanding General.
i

Below the Commanding General were the commanders of the

I

I
!

geographical departments.

These departments, not to be confused

with the staff departments in Washington, controlled all troop

I

units within their boundaries, which usually included several

I

sl.::.ates.
~, orders could be issued by the Secretary of War or by
_ _ _ _,~_AI!~_,.,
__

I

I!

~~!

o_ _

i

the Commanding General, and they would be transmitted downward

I!

through this chain of command until they reached the organiza-

I

!

tion they were intended for.

However, if logistics was involved,

I

the heads of the staff departments, nominally acting for the

I

Secretary of War, issued directives to their representatives in
the headquarters of the geographical departments.

i,

I

These indi-

viduals then passed the directives down to commanders of units
in the field, who had to carry them out.

Since the staff de-

partments had a limited number of personnel, the actual work of
these departments in Army units was accomplished by officers of
the units as a detail.
The two chains of command operated independently of each
other, and thus, inevitably, confusion arose when orders issued
through one chain were found to be in conflict with orders issued through the other.

The Commanding General, not unreason-

ably, felt that he should command all of the Army, including the
staff departments.

The Secretary, on the other hand, was the

head of the Army, and therefore, he felt that all of the departments, both staff and geographical, and the Commanding General
should take orders from him.
The net effect of the situation was that every time a
conflicting situation arose, it had to be dealt with individually, with a consequent delay, to say nothing of arguments as to
who was right, and who had had the authority to issue the order.

I

This situation had continued, with varying amounts of trouble,
from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Spanish_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _______-_.M_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~~

I
t

____
fl._____. ____

~£.'~

I

~~J

American War.

people who were responsible for getting logistical tasks accomplished.

They usually operated independently, with cases of

overlapping or disputed functions being handled by an exchange
of views by mail.

The capacities for delay in such a system are

obvious, but in the peacetime Army, time was not really that important.
The officers assigned to staff departments

wer~

not only

operating with little knowledge of the other staff departments.
They did not really have much idea of what was going on in the
field, since staff assignments were permanent, and once ensconced in Washington, few officers went out to field units.
The communications necessary for the conduct of normal business
were by mail, and the Washington staff officers dealt with their
counterparts in the headquarters of the geographical departments.
The staff officers in the geographical departments were also
permanently assigned, which was not too bad because the headquarters were usually located in major cities like Chicago or
st. Louis, and like their fellows in Washington, these officers
rarely went out to visit field units.

Most of the time, busi-

ness could be handled by mail or telegraph, although upon occasion, a ma j or concentration of troops at some point in the departrnent might cause one or more staff officers to be reassigned
to the point of concentration for a period of time, to administer the work of his staff depar'tinent.
~-----------------------------------------.~-~~--
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In defense of these staff officers, it must be added

;:.

"·

,··

-

·'

~

i~

that the scope of their activities was indeed vast , covering a

I

variety of activities that a modern army staff would subdivide

I

among many more men.

~

For example, the Quartermaster's Depart-

ment had the following duties:
• • • to provide the Army with military stores and
supplies requisite for its use, such as clothing
and equipage, tents, band instruments, tableware and
mess furniture, equipment for bakeries, fuel, forage,
stationery, lumber, straw for bedding of men and
animals, all materials for camp and for shelter of
troops and stores, furniture for barracks, heating
and cooking stoves for use in barracks, tools for
mechanics and laborers in Quartermaster's Department,
furniture, books, etc., for post schools, reading
matter for post libraries, wagons, ambulances, carts,
saddles, harnesses, water supply, sewerage, plumbing,
illuminating supplies and heating for all military
posts and buildings.
The Department is also charged with the duty of
transporting by land and water; troops, munitions of
war, equipments, and all articles of military supplies from the place of purchase to the several armies,
garrisons, posts and recruiting places.
It also supplies quartermaster's stores, clothing
and equipages to the militia of the states and
Territories, furnishinq transportation therefor, as
well as for ordnance and ordnance stores issued by the
general Government to states and Territories.
It prepares the plans and constructs the barracks,
quarters, storehouses, hospitals, etc., builds the
wharves, constructs the roads, builds bridges at
military posts, provides, by hire or purchase, grounds
for military encampments and buildings, contracts for
all horses for cavalry, artillery, Indian scouts, etc.,
and pays all incidental expenses of the mi lita±,y service which are not provided by other branches. 3
The SUbsistence Department, while not bearing a load as
large as the Quartermaster1s Department, still had an important
group of duties, namely:

i

• • • the purchasing, issuing, and preservation of
subsistence supplies: also the distribution, selling,
.
and accountability therefor. 4 ~_______
____~_______J
I

~

The Medical Department's duties, as may well be surmised,i
dealt with the physical welfare of the troops.

The duties were:

• • • the duty of investigating the sanitary condition
of the Army, and making recommendations in .reference
thereto, with the duty of caring for the sick and
wounded, making physical examinations of officers and
enlisted men, and furnishing all medical and hospital
supplies, except for public animals. 5
The Ordnance Department was responsible for:
• • • procuring, by purchase or manufacture, and
distributing the necessary ordnance and ordnance
supplies for the Government, and the establishment
and maintenance of arsenals and depots for their manufacture and safekeeping. 6
From the above listing of functions it is easy to surmise that the Army certainly had a good idea of what it had to
accomplish, and should, therefore, have been ready to do so.

In

fact, though the lists of duties were long, the numbers of personnel available to accomplish the jobs were few.

For example,

the Quartermaster's Department had a total strength of fiftyseven officers at the outbreak of war. 7

~1 the credit side, it

must be said that these officers did have experience in arranging rail movements of bodies of troops, but the lack of experience in purchasirlg, contracting, and handling large quantities
of material more than offset this slight advantage.
staff departments were in little better shape.

The other

The Commissary-

General of SUbsistence had
• • • only 22 officers , viz., the Commissary-General,
2 colonels, 3 lieutenant colonels, 8 majors and 8
captains. 8
The Medical Department had " • • • 124 medical officers, United

..

r
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C.. .

.
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states Army, and 60 contract surgeons on duty in the field. n9
The Ordnance Department had the following amount avail-

able I
• • • 1 Brigadier-General, 3 Colonels, 4 Lieutenant
Colonels, 10 Majors, 22 captains, 14 First Lieutenants,
1 Ordnance storekeeper with rank of Major and 1 Ordnance storekeeper with rank of captain • • .10
The Army had no one charged with the responsibility of
planning for war.

The staff departments were occupied completely

with the conduct of day to day business, and the Secretary and
Commanding General had to worry about the business, too.
advent of war was, if anything, a remote possibility.

The

When it

came, the logisticians had to improvise to meet rapidly changing
conditions.

I
I

I

CHAPTER II
PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND
SHIPMENT OF TROOPS
President McKinley conferred on March 6 with the chairman of the House Appropriations Conunittee, Mr. Cannon, on the
subject of money for the war.

McKinley told Cannon, " • • • I

must have money to get ready for war.

I am doing everything

possible to prevent war, but it must come and we are not prepared
for war.

Who knows where this war will lead us; it may be more

than a war with Spain.
ordinary expenditures?"l

How can I get the money for these extraMcKinley's worries as to how the funds

were to be obtained were unfounded, for, on l<1arch 9, both Houses
passed an appropriation of fifty million dollars for national
defense by unanimous votes.
Having gotten the funds, it was now the task of the
President to apportion it B.nd give directions for its use.
such a large amount to use, results could be expected.
1y, few results were forthcoming.

With

Amazing-

II
I

One writer comments as fol-

lows:
Under the appropriation made on March 9, 1898 of
$50,000,000 for 'national defense', much had been done
in preparation by the ordinance and engineer and signa1service departments, to which ten, five and a half and

II
!

I
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i

named. The quartermaster, commissary, and medical departments, up to April 23, by what would appear a
singular interpretation on the part of President
McKinley and his advisors, had ~ot been allowed to go
outside their ordinary routine.

I
1

i•

The division of funds mentioned is very interesting, With!
three of the most important branches, logistically speaking,
gi ven nothing additional \;1i th which to prepa.re for war.

It is a

I

i

measure of the logistical ignorance of the period, when items

II

like clothing, food and medicine were not provided for.

,

As a

matter of fact, the three departments mentioned as receiving
funds were equally limited since the funds were specifically
limited to expenditures for coast defense.

Secretary of War,

R. A. Alger, points this out, saying, "Allotments were therefore
made, out of the $50,000,000 fund to the Ordnance, Engineer,
Quartermaster, Medical and Signal Corps, as follows:

Ordnance

[about] $10,000,000; Engineer, $5,500,000; Quartermaster,
$500,000; Medical, $20,000i Signal, $226,400.
for purposes of coast defense • • • 3.

All of this was

The Ordnance, Engineers,

and Signal Corps had a great deal of work to do with the coastal
defenses, but,

tI • • •

the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical

Departments, up to Apri l 23rd, had been denied even the privilege of endeavor.

I
~

ii

I

Not one of these, unce r the President' sinter-I

pretation of the term 'national defense (' had been permitted to
take a step outside the ordinary routine; they could not either
procure or order anything in the way of equir:'ment. •

Be-

cause of this, absolutely nothing had been added to the ordinary

I

II
!!

I
~

"","_>~J

supply as it existed Harch 9, 1898. ,, 4
Later on, we will look further at the results of this
limitation, but at this time it is important for us to consider
what

'VIas

done by the Army, specifically the offices of the

Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, to prepare for
the mobilization and shipment of the Army.
was responsible for mobilization.

The Adjutant-General

On April 15, 1898, a letter

was sent to the commanding generals of all departments ordering
the concentration of

Re~ular

Army troups from their departments

at a number of camps and coast defense installations. 5

At the

same time, a letter was directed to his subordinates by the
Adjutant-General instructing them to sand telegraphic orders to
Major General Brooke, and Brigadier-Generals Shafter, Coppinger,
and Wade to establish camps at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, New
Orleans, Louisiana, Mobile, Alabama, and Tampa, Florida.

The

generals were directed to send their chief quartermasters ahead
to select camp grounds for the troops ordered to assemble at
these places. 6

Orders were also sent releasing officers from

their assignments at infantry and cavalry schools and returning

!,

them to their reg im£mt 5 • 7
The order of April 15 directed the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-First Regiments of
Infantry to assemble at Tampa, where Brigadier-General William
Shafter commanded.

The Regular Army was being prepared for war.

I!

I

I

I
I
I

The

voluntec~rs

were not summoned to the colors until the Presi-

dents's call for 125,000 men on April 23, 1898.

In the interest

~

of maintaining continuity, the movement of the Regulars to their
mobilization stations \4ill be examined.

Obviously I the Adjutant-

General's office had prepared for the issuing of the orders, and
the amount of men to be moved, while unusual, was not outside
the capabilities of the Quartermaster's Department.

Both of

these departments had moved units of the Regular Army from place
to place during peacetime for annual firing exercises, parades,
and other activities.

Now these units were being moved to mo-

bilization stations, but the mechanics of movement remained the
same.
The Fourth Infantry was stationed at Fort Sheridan,
Illinois.

On April 19, 1898, it moved from this station to

Tampa, Florida.

The U. S. Government had

it

Pennsylvania Railroad to move the regiment.

contract with the
Thirty-one officers

and 475 enlisted men participated in the movement.

The total

cost to the government for troop movement into Tampa ,."as
$9,452.08, or $18.68 per man.

The regiment also brought three

carloads of baggage, which were charged at the rate of $146.00
each, or a total of $438.00. 8
Also moving to Tampa was the Fifth U. S. Infantry! but
they were diverted to Pensacola, Florida, and Fort

~1cPherson

Tybee Island, Georgia, from which they eventually reached

and

th(~ir

destination in July.9
The Sixth U. S. Infantry came from Fort Thomas, Georgia
on April 19, via the Louisville an! Nashville Railroad.

Tlw

526 officers and men of this unit cost $10,919.76 to move, an

average of $20.76 per man.

In additi.on, the unit brought three

carloads of baggage, two of which were sent at the rate of $131
apiece, with the third costing $184, for a total of $446. 10
The Ninth Infantry Regiment came from Madison Barracks,
New York, on the W & A Railroad.

Like the other regiments, they

moved on April 19, but their movement costs "Jere apparently a
little higher.

The trip cost $27.72 a man, or $12,994.72 for

the 476 individuals who made up the unit.

While this was a lit-

tle higher rate, the real difference in costs is found in the
ch.arges for the regiments baggage.

Each of fonr cars was charged

$319.15, for a total of $1,276.00.

Regrettably, the Army re-

cords of this movement do not reveal what the cause for this
high charge was. l1
Also paying a higher charge for movement was the Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, "'hich carne from Buffalo.

The rate per

man was $26.35, for a regimental total of $10,065.70, a not unreasonable amount in comparison with the amount per man paid by
the Ninth.

The baggaqe difference is worthy of note, with the

three cars of impedimenta being charged at the rate of $223.00,
a total of $669.00.

This is a difference of $96.15 in baggage

rate, as opposed to a difference in the individual rate of only
$1.37. 12
The Seventeenth U. S. Infantry moved from Columbus
Barracks, Ohio by the Pennsylvania Railroad.

The 511 men of

this unit went at the rate of $18.33 each, or $9,366.63 for the
whole regiment.

Like the Sixth, the unit's baggage was charged

at different rates, one carload going for $172.00, while the
other three cost only $129.00, for a total of $559.00 for regimental baggage. 13
The final unit ordered to Tampa by the War Department
order of April 15 was the Twenty-First Infantry. which was in
Plattsburg, New York.

It moved on the W & A Line, a total of

476 men for a total fare of $12,937.68.

The four carloads of

regimental baggage went at the rate of $319.15, the same amount
it cost the Ninth Infantry, and there was only $.54 difference
in the individual rate between the two regiments.

The total

cost of regimental baggage movement was $1,276.60. 14
Taken individually, the above statistics have interest
for the scholar, since they reflect the rates current for persons and baggage at the time.

Of far more importance, however,

is the information which can be derived from a study of the statistics for all of these regiments.
The first item which can be deduced from the statistics
is an estimate of the capability of the ave rage Regular Army
regiment to move upon short notice.

The o rder for movement was

issued on April 15, and each of the units
moved on April 19th.

we have mentioned

This gives us a figure of four days for

packing and movement for a unit of between four and five hundred
men.

A good part of this time was undoubtedly spent in packing

and loading all of the items of unit impedimenta, which l eads us
to another point about which we may make deductions.

Ea c .t1 of

units had either three or four carloads of this baggage, which

may be thus accepted as average figures for typical units of this }
size.

Later on, when other units arc moved into Tampa, we will

have an opportunity to see whether this figure holds up for Regular troops, and how it compares with the amounts brought by the
Volunteers.
We may also deduce from the bare facts of this movement
that these regiments were in a good state of training.

A cer-

tain amount of discipline is required for a unit movement, and a
poorly trained or untrained unit shows a lack of this discipline
when moving.
The lack of movement discipline is reflected in comments
of both railroad officials and technical service officers.

Re-

marks such as "a lot of rough fellows" and "abused our coaches·'
came from the railroads. lS
The next item which may be inferred from the statistics
is that the chief quartermasters who negotiated with the railroads did a fairly consistent job.

The rates for each movement

vary but little for the individuals, and the two occasions where
rates for baggage seem high are both on units moving from New
York State, and on the same railroad, the W & A.
Thus far, we have discussed only the units of the Regular
Anny, covering them through their mobilization and movement to
Tampa.

Just three days after the units we have discussed moved

to Tampa, the President issued a call for 125,000 men.

Let us

now turn to a discussion of the mobilization procedures used for
handling these 125,000, and then, to a discussion of their

movement to Tampa.
The Adjutant-Ceneral was the individual department head
with the responsibility for transforming the President's call
into a concrete system, and placing that system into operation.
Let us let him tell us how this was done, in the words he used
to tell a Congressional Committee:
Question: • • • on April 23, the President issued a proclamation calling for 100,000 (sic] volunteers. Then
what did the War Department do?
Answer: It took all the steps necessary to carry the
order into immedia.te effect. ~le apportioned the number
of troops that were to be furnished by each State, and
mustering officers were duly appointed and rendezvous
selected, and these officers were mustering in men as
fast as the 16 coulc1 be e>:amined. I think we were about
forty days.
In the course of the mustering-in process, the State
Militia underwent a change.

When the officers and men were

sworn in, they became part of the Federal Force, the Volunteer
Army as it was called.
As it had done so many times in the past, the system of
State Militia again created a problem.

Since the State gover-

nors had the power to appoint the officers of this militia,
would they allow the President to have this power, which would
seem to be necessary if the units became part of a federal
force?

Also would units going into the active federal service be

required to change their unit designations?

Such a move would

offend the members of this militia, who cherished the history of
their units, many of which had existed continuously since the
Revolution.

Yet, considerable confusion could be expected in an

army which had a second regiment of infantry, and, for example,
a Second Massachusetts or a Second Illinois.

Orders could be

missent, and people confused by a number of different units with
similar designations.
The l'lar Department had recognized the existence of both
of these problems, and had held a number of conferences attempting to solve them.

The memory of the performance of state mili-

tia units in the Civil War was still strong and the War Department did not want repetition of such performance.

The Department

drafted a bill to be presented to Congress which might solve the
problems.

It would set up a federal force, with officers ap-

pointed by the President, since the force was for service outside the borders of the states.

The force was to be composed of

volunteers, but would not be called a volunteer army.
However, the War Department was dealing with political
forces, and before the bill was even sent to Congress, it had
agreed to take any militia regiment into active service, if it
was at full strength.

It had also agreed not to allow appoint-

ment of any "West-Pointers" to this volunteer force.

The mili-

tia regiments had a long tradition of appointing their own officers, and would not be likely to allow any of the graduates of
the military academy to usurp their privileges, to say nothing
of introducing Regular Army ideas of discipline and training
into the militia.

The bill was finally passed, but with the pro-

vision that militia regiments could be received directly into
the active service if at full strength, and that all officers

would be appointed by the President only upon the

recommend:~~~-I
I

of the state governors. 17
The whole problem of appointment of officers has relation to logistics primarily because of the fact that many of the
appointments later were proved to be unwise by the performance
of the men.

In particular, there were appointments of men as

quartermasters of units, and resultant confusion because of lack
of experience, ignorance or inefficiency.
Thus the forces which were to fight the
surned their character.

l~ar

of 1898 as-

The militia, in whatever state of train-

ing and equipment, was to be taken in, and subjected to a minimum

0

f

. fl uence. 18
Regu 1 ar Army ~n

Uh at a b out t h e actua 1 meC1an1
ty

ics of induction or '.'mustering-in?"

How was this force assem-

bled and shipped?
The answer of the Adjutant-General to the Congressional
committee which we have quoted above gives only the bare outlines.

Upon receiving their allotment of units, each state se-

lected the units which it desired to send.

This selection in

itself had a distinctly political character, for the party in
power at the State Capitol made the selections with the idea
that they would eventually reap some political benefit from the
future war heroes.

Thus, it is no surprise that Nebraska ap-

pointed William Jennings Dryan a colonel of militia.
Having selected the units, the states directed their assembly at a designated rendezvous, usually the State Capitol.
At this point, physical examinations were given, and if the men

passed, they were mustered into the federal service.

During the

period of rendezvous, the volunteers enjoyed the adulation bf the
local populace, and many parades were staged for local dignitaries.

Little in the way of training or equipping the units

was done, because it was assumed that a militia unit needed littIe training beyond what it had, and, of course, the federal government would provide any equipment necessary.
The question of equipment was to provide a real problem
for the War Department, since the volunteers were found to be in
all stages of equipment and dress when they were mustered in.
But little could be done in the mustering camp, "lith friends,
sweethearts, and families looking on.

So the mili tia

\~ere

moved

out to a place where they could absorb some of the influence of
the Regular Army.

In addition, having the large mass of men to-

gether would simplify the logistics, since large quantities
could be shipped to one point for issue.
The Quartermaster General \iaS the staff officer responsible for movement of these units, as he had been for the movement
of the Regulars.

His testimony before a Congressional Committee,

like that of the Adjutant-Ceneral, shows the outlines of what
was done.
On May 8, in anticipation of the movement of the volunteer

forces of the country to field duty, the QuartermasterGeneral prepared lists of those to be shipped from each
locality and sent them to the officers of the Quartermaster's Department who would be charged with the transportation. The following is a copy of the letter as send
out:
Sir:

The tvar Department has informed the Quarterrnaster-

1I"""'"'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _

~~~:9 t~-~.lIII'-~ ~'~ :1

,

General that as soon as mustered in and equipped at the
several points of rendezvous in the states referred to,
the volunteer forces of the United States mentioned on
the enclosed statement will be sent to the national camps
and points of defense and reserve .s indicated thereon.
You will examine the list with a view of determining
the requirements for the transportation of the troops from
the states embraced in the Department • • • to points of
destination when their movement is ordered.
After familiarizing yourself with the necessary detail
of this subject, you will consult the railroads interested
in the transportation of these troops, and determine, as
far as practicable, such preliminaries as can be settled
in advance of the movement.
The exact number of troops to come with each organization is not known to this office, but will be communicated
to you as soon as the information is obtained. It is
thought, however, that the necessary routes of travel can
be definitely fixed, and such competition invited as will
secure the most advantageous rates for each movement, so
that when instructions are communicated to you to have the
troops go forward there will be nothing to delay their
prompt shipment.
It is suggested, to avoid crowding, where troops are
to go out overnight a double seat be given each man.
The subject is therefore committed to your discretion,
with the request that you will take all the preliminary
steps deemed by you advisable, and keep the OUartermasterGeneral informed of the more important features of the
matter.
Respectfully,
M.I. Ludington
Quartermaster-General of the u.s. 19
It will be seen from the above statement that the
Quartermaster-General had made preparations, and directed his
subordinates to make as detailed preparations as were possible
under the circumstances.

How

would the Quartermaster-General's

subordinates be made aware of the impending movements?

The

Quartermaster-General had written to the Adjutant-General on this
subject.
• • • if the Adjutant-General will give this office immediate notice when advised that any troops are ready to be
transported to the field, with the name of the proper

I

officer to address relative to their transportation, the
Quartermaster-General will at once notify such officer by
wire the address of the proper officer of the Quartermaster's Department to whom to apply for transportation,
and at the same time the quartermaster will be instructed
by wire to supply the required transportation with the
least possible delay.
If this proposed line of action ia strictly carried
out, it i8 thought that the volunteer troops will be placed
in the field at the leaat possible cost to the united states
and with the least practicable delay to the military service.
Respectfully,
M. I. Ludington
20
Quartermaster-General of the U.S.
On

the surface, it would appear that the staff depart-

ments had planned well, and had made arrangements for the movements in advance of the time they were to be made.

In addition,

the movement of the Regular Army had been carried out successfully, which would seem to presage similar success for the v01unteers.

The only difference was one of degree.
In addition to the 125,000

vc lunt ~~r s

requested by

McKinley on April 23, he requested 75,000 volunteers on May 25,
which made the Army re.ponsible for the transportation of 200,000
meno 21

The difference in degree was tenfold, and although the

AnMY had planned to handle the movements, there were just not
enough men in the OUartenMaster's Department to personally supervise each movement.

This had an effect on the efficiency of the

operation, since there waa usually no individual well-infonMed
on the contract detaila to insure their enforcement at the time
of movement.

This problem was not so great with the Regulars

who were used to moving, and aware of their entitlements.
In addition to the problem of having too few qualified

~
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men to aid in directing the movement, the Quartermaster-General's l
I

office had to also come to the realization that the movement of
200,000 men represented a considerable demand on the railroad
system of the united States.
This railroad deficiency constituted a problem over which
the Army had no control.

Although plans had been made for the

shipment of the volunteer units when they were ready, the railroads stood as a stumbling block to the fulfillment of these
plans. 22
Pressure was developing on the War Department to do something about an invasion of CUba.

General Miles had recommended

that no invasion be made until after the rainy season, so that
the Army could be better trained in large-scale operations, and
so that the danger of disease would be lessened.

But President

McXinley seemed to have little regard for the possibility of such
problems.

Early in May, he had told the Army to take 70,000 men

and capture Havana, without trying to find out whether the Army
could muster such a number.

In fact, the Volunteers were still

being shipped into Chickamauga, and the Regulars into Tampa,
during the end of May.23
units of the Regular Army had been detached from their
original points of concentration beginning in April, and ordered
to move to Tampa.

The 9th cavalry was sent from Chickamauga on

the N.C. and st. L. Railroad, as was the 24th Infantry.

The 1st

Infantry was moved from New Orleans, and the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 12th'J'
16th, 22d and 25th Infantry from their points of concentration.

By May 25th, General Shafter, commanding at Tampa, could report
to the War Department that he had five regiments of Regular
cavalry, sixteen regiments of Regular Infantry, ten batteries of
light artillery, two companies of engineers, a signal detachment
and four batteries of heavy artillery.

This force of about

25,000 men represented almost all of the Regular Army. 24
By the time that General Shafter submitted his report,

units of the Volunteer Army were beginning to arri.ve at Tampa.•
As

of the date of his report, there were ten regiments of vJ lun-

teers assigned to Shafter's Fifth Corps.

Seven of the regiments

were at Tampa, having been moved there directly from their points
of mustering-in.

These were the Seventy-First New York, the

Second Massachusetts, the Third and Fifth Ohio, the Second
Georgia, the Thirty-Second Michigan and the Second Wisconsin.
The problem of water supply was the reason the other
three regiments were not at Tampa.

General Shafter outlined his

problena and actions in a telegram to the COmmanding General.
On account of difficulty in finding suitable camp ground
with abundant water supply, I have temporarily stopped
part of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville and placed
thaD under command of General Lawton. The Government will
not be subjected to extra expense on account of the transportation nor for supply depots or officer. They will be
brought closer to Tampa as soon as possible. The principal
difficulty here i. water, which must be drawn from wells.
Surface wells cannot be used. 25

The three regiment. at Jacksonville were the Second
Illinois, First North carolina, and Fifth Iowa. 26

All three

received orders diverting them from their original destination
while en route.

The Second Illinois was the first unit to arrive

at Jacksonville, having received its orders on the same day the
telegram was sent from Shafter to Milea.

It was followed the

next day by the First North carolina, and a few days later by
the Fifth Iowa.
The shipment of troops waa an immediate problem which
had to be faced by the

Army.

The planning of the Quartermaster's

Department had to be comprehensive enough to cover movements of
both Regular and Volunteer units.

Plans made by the quarter-

masters of geographical departments were quite specific in details of accommodations, and when it was possible, in destination.

The Q.lartermaster of the Department of the Lakes issued a

public notice inviting sealed bids from the various railroads.
The bids were to be made for a journey between a specified point
within the department to a specified mobilization point.

The

notice also required -that after twelve hours' notice required
equipment will be furnished aa called for by the

Quarte~ster's

Department,- and -that the troops, their horses and freight, will
be 'run' in solid trains from initial to ultimate point.- 27

In

addition, the notice provided that when troops made a journey of
longer than one day, each man was to have a double seat.
The specific purpose of this aection has been to outline
the actions taken by the ouartermaster's Department during the
period before the war, and during the period of mobilization and
shipment to the initial station.
The second section of the survey on transportation moves
into an area in which no one in the Army had any experience, that

of movement by water.

The work done in ship chartering, fitting-

out and purchasing was the first ever done in this area by the
Army, at least within the memory of anyone in the War Department.
The Ar.my's experience with river steamboats in the west was
hardly applicable to sea-going vessels.
In order to place the work of the

Army

in water trans-

port in its proper perspective, it is necessary to refer to the
"Fifty Million Bill" for "national defense," and the interpretation of this piece of legislation by President McRinley and his
advisors.

Under McKinley's interpretation, the Army could make

no offensive preparations, but the Navy, on the other hand was
obliged to make all possible preparations for coast defense.
The Navy Department took advantage of this interpretation, and
made arrangements to charter most of the available ships, for use
in the accomplishing of its defense mission.
The U.S. Army, on the eve of war, had no ships with which
to move troops, because of the rigid interpretation of McRinley.
What is worse, there was no mechanism and there were no precedents for handling the movement of troops by water.
problem into the time-frame gives it more force.

Placing this

In a period of

slightly more than forty days, the Army, specifically the office
of the Quartermaster-General, had to evolve the techniques necessary to charter ships and buy ships, actually acquire the ships
through charter or purchase, prepare them for military use as
troop transports or cargo vessels, and get them to the point of
use.

The preparations which could be made for war were limited
to surveys of the market.

On

March 24# such a survey was ordered

• • • The Quartermaster-General directed the depot quartermaster in New York to report at once all available vessels
of the coastline steamship companies that could be obtained
by charter, and to state their capacity, etc. The reply
reached him on March 29# furnishing the desired information,
but adding that a member of the board on auxiliary cruisers
had stated that the Navy had absolute opti~B on all boats
of the most prominent steamship companies.
This survey was to be kept secret by the Depot Quartermaster, as instructions in the letter ordering the survey indicate. 29

Only American flag ships were to be considered for ser-

vice.
From the report of the Depot Quartermaster, it would
appear that no ships were to be had.
known that the

Army

However, when it became

was actually chartering ships, many offers

were received.
When it became known that the Department required vessels
for Army transport service, tenders of vessels for charter.
and purchase were received from all the prominent steamship companies, and inspections of the vessels were made
by officers of the Department, and reported to this office
with a view to selection of those best suited for the
service. 30
Apparently ship owners decided that the chances of profit
were enough for them to risk their ships, and decided to offer
them for charter, thus opening up the market.

The mention of

inspections is the first hint of chartering technique.

SUch

inspections would be the responsibility of the officer in charge
of chartering vessels.
master at

New

Colonel Amos Ktmball, the Depot Quarter-

York, gave the job of inspecting potential charter

~___________________________________________________,__
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ve••els to hi. a •• istant, Major John W. SUmmerhayes.

Major

summerhayes described the method of inspectiona
I went through the vessel and examined her and I had the
engineers give me a statement as to the condition of her
boilers and engines, and alao the amount of water she could
carry, the amount of coal she could carry in her bunkers,
and iilshe had staving capacity, if she could put on extra
coal.
Thus, in addition to inspecting the ship, Major swamerhayes got an estimate of her fuel-carrying capacity.
the

A~

However,

also had to know how many men every vessel could carry.

A Navy officer was detailed to aid sw.merhayes in making this
estimation.

The technique used was borrowed from the British,

and provided that for each ten and a half of carrying capacity,
one man could be carried. 32
After inspection, the tenders for charter or purchase
were forwarded to Washington along with the reports of the inape
ting officer.
Oolonel Kimball described the next step, which concluded
with final approval or rejection of the inspected ships.
• • • they were examined by Oolonel Hecker, under his
direction by experts, and then the great bulk of them were
accepted. The formal contract was made by Oolonel Bird,
who was on duty in the Quarterma8ter-General's office, he
being right there, and they being turned right into r8ic]
him, but the work of detailed inspection, of passing j~
the 8hips, was under the direction of Oolonel Hecker.
Before the reports and tenders were sent directly to
Colonel Bird.

This is significant because all of the transports

for the Tampa area destined for the Shafter expedition to CUba
were thu8 excluded from the technical 8crutiny of Colonel Hecker,

I
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a civilian shipping expert appointed directly from civil life,
and hi • •taff.

I

This technical scrutiny was primarily an analy-

.i. of whether the .hip. could be used a. tran.port ••
Ships which were accepted for charter would be contracted for at a daily rate.

Colonel Bird was responsible for work- ,
j

ing out this rate, and .ubmitting it to the Assistant secretary
of War for his approval.

'!'he working out of the rate was done

in negotiations with the owner. of the ve.sel.

Colonel Bird

worked according to the tonnage of the v •••• l. in trying to .et
charter fiqures.
I tried to arrange it by tonnage. We tried to pay 15
cent. for a gro.s ton • • • for 3,000 tons and over.
Question a What does 15 cents a gross ton mean?
Answer. Say a v.ssel i. 3,000 tons, 15 cents would be
$450 a day. Under that w. tried to arrange for 20 cent.
a ton, and under 2,000, 25 cents per ton.
Question a SO far a. you were concerned, then, the price.
were determined by the Secretary of War after a confer.nce
with you?
Answer. Always. 34

Armed with these figures, and the approval of the Assistant Secretary, Colonel Bird then concluded the negotiations
and chartered the vessel.
The rates received after the negotiation. seemed to
correspond to the guidelin.s the Colonel had mentioned.

How-

ever, some of the earlier charters carried a special rate, with
one amount to be paid daily for the first thirty days, and a
second, lower rate to be paid for periods over thirty days, if
the ve.sel was retained in service by the government.

Exampl.s

of this group are the Olivette. chart.red April 30, $500 for

tered April 29, $625 and $575.

Ships chartered later were

gotten at a single rate, with one exception, the Specialist.
chartered June 3, with rates of $425 and $375. 35
Rates for other vessels correspond closely to the tonnage rate figures.

For example, the Slratoga and Seneca. of

1,943 and 1,939 tons respectively, went at the rate of $450

daily, actually lower than the rate of 25 cents a ton which was
given for thoae ships below 2,000 tons.

The Segur,nca, of 2,806

tons, and the Vi9ilancil' of 2,934 tons, carried the rate of
$600 daily.

This rate was slightly higher than the 20 cents a

ton for ships between 2,000 and 3,000 tons, but not as high as
the 25 cents for ships below 2,000 tons.
SOme variance i. found in earlier figures, which would
indicate that, at least in the beginning, there was .ame hesitancy about the amount to be paid for a charter.

The Olivette.

which we have already mentioned, had a rate amounting to over
30 cents a ton for the first thirty days.

However, as time

went on, experience must have been gained, for we find that ten
days after chartering the Olivette. the Department got a ship of
half again the size, the Orizabl. for the same amount. 36
Included in the charter rate were master and crew, and
acceptance of all marine risk by the owners.

This meant that if

the ship were damaged while under charter, the Army would not be
liable.

i'he """ere 18ad.

80IIle

attempt. to get th:
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take the marine risk. but were not successful.
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The Army had to

provide provisions and fuel, and make its own modifications to
the interior of the ships.
In the case of ships offered to the government of purchase, Colonel Hecker was the principal operator.

He described

the procedure for the Dodge Commission.
Qu.etiona Did you have any hand in the purchase of vessels
An8Wera Yes, sir.
Questiona Haw many did you purchase, and when?
Anaver a Seventeen in all.
Question: Between what dates?
Answer a Between the 25th of JUne and about the same date
in 3Uly, about thirty daye.
Queetiona In the purchase of these • • • vesse18, Colonel,
as I understand it you were acting with the engineer, the
consulting engineer who was in the employ of the Department.
Answer a Yes, air.
Question I Did you _ploy any intermediary agents or did
you deal directly with the owners of the vessels?
Answer: We dealt directly with the owners of these vessels, or with the parties who represented the owners when
we could not get at the owners.
Question: • • • In purchasing these vessels, did you fix
the value in view of the demand which was made for them,
or upon their intrinsic value?
Answers Largely based on their intrinsic value as c~uted
by Mr. Rirby [the Department's consulting engineer].37
Colonel Hecker had begun negotiations for some of the
ships eventually purchased during the months of May and JUne,
before accepting his Army commission.

However, the deals were

not consummated until the period noted above.
After value had been computed, negotiations were carried out, a price fixed, and the contract executed.

The use of

technical experts was a large factor in the success of the government in acquiring vessels for use.

HOwever, the vessels used

~----------------------------------------~-----------~~
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at Tampa were not purchased but chartered.

,"
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The purchased ves-

sels were not used until after the expedition to Cuba had left.

I

I
t

I

How many ships were actually obtained through charter
and purchase?

The Dodge Commission gave the following figures

in its report to the President.
The testimony before the OommissiQn shows that between
April 1 and August 31, 44 steamships were chartered and
14 purchased for service in the Atlantic and Gulf waters;
• • • and that all were fitted up to a certain extent, 38
for the transportation of troops, animals and supplies.
Of this group, thirty-eight were sent to Tampa to move
the Fifth Corps to Cuba.
The ships that had been obtained were cargo vessels, and
considerable modification would be necessary before they could
be used to carry troops.

These modific&tions were a source of

trouble, particularly in the first group of vessels chartered.
Major Summerhayes was put in charge of this phase of the operation.

Later, in response to a question from a member of the

Dodge Commission, he said that the first group of ships chartered were not suitable for troop ships.
they were too small. 3S

His reason was that

Size aside, modifications in ventilation I

II
cargoes.
I
The Major described the procedure followed in making the I
and sanitary facilities would be necessary for troop or animal

modifications and preparing the ships for movement.
• • • the first vessels that went out we had so short a
time to fit them out, we could not put in the standee
bunks • • ., we had not the canvas in the first place,
and in the second place we had not the skilled workmen.
They were built out of wood. They were put in clusters
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of 12, three berth. high and a long space between them
of about 2 feet between each clu.ter on the sides and
ends.
Question I Having put the bunk. in, what was the next
step?
Answer: I had four or five days to fix up the ship, working night and day, after that, toilets were put in.
Wherever we could find the space for cooking - the only
chance the men had to cook on the.e ships was during
night - they all went with travel ration, and the only
cooking ab.olutely necessary was cooking coffee, and they
did that at night. Those were the first transports. 40
The techniques for fitting out became lDOre sophisticated
as time went on, and particularly after the immediate n.ed for
traneports for Tampa had been fill.d.

Th. initial period was

a time of rushing to get the .hips pr.pared, while the people
who were working on the shipe were learning the technique. of
preparing them.

Por example, Major SUl1IDlerhaye. pointed out to

a member of the Dodge Coamd.sion who a.ked why the ships .ent
to Tampa did not have forced draft ventilation systems.

General, I was g.tting an order. under.tand these .hips
had to go at once. I would have anywhere from. three to
five day. to take a ship and fit her up to go to sea.
We put 100 men on, working night and day. It was a ru.h
order. 4l
Actually, the que.tion of forced draft ventilation did
not come up until the troop. at Tampa had been on board the
v ••••le for almost a week.

General Mil.. telegraphed the

Quart.rma.t.r-General on June 14 and directed him to have forced
draft ventilation installed on all future vessels. 42
The problem of trying to fit out the ve ••• ls in a race
against tim. ie illustrated by three example..

The first con-

cerned the purchase of ship's stores and food for the crew••

Charles L. SWift, the surveyor for the fleet, was asked why
competitive bids were not requested for the supplies.
plied,

~e

He re-

could not very well do that when I got an order

tonight [sic] to furnish a ship tomorrow. 43

He told the commis-

sion that this had happened several times.
The second example involves Major Summerhayes' assistant during the fi tting-out period, Henry P. Kirkham.

When

asked by the Dodge Commission if the transports sent out could
have been made better, he replied that they could have been mad, '
better, but said,

waa not time • • • sometimes I would
be all night long at the yard • • • and then the men had to be
·~ere

on hand all times, nights and Sundays ...44
The third example shows the kind of orders received by
SUmmerhayes.

In

a telegram sent to Summerhayes, the Quarter-

master-General says, "The following ves.els chartered to sail
immediately [emphasis mine] to Key W.at, .. 45 and follows this
directive with a list of twelve ships.

The charters had been

made on May 10 and 11, and the list of ships ¥as received by
SUmmerhayes May 11.

Given the rate of three to five days per

ship, Summerhayes mentioned in his testimony, thes. twelve ships
should not have been

rea~~

before JUne 14 at the earliest.

As

a matter of fact, some of the ships mentioned in the Quartermaster-Generales telegram were at Tampa in time for loading on
..rune 7.
time.

SUmmerhayes had done his job well, and finiahed it on
The problema which aroae about the ships later were

either those which were not foreseen in time, like the forced

~--------------------------~~--~~

draft ventilation, or those about which nothing could be done,
like the problem of capacity.
This chapter has covered mobilization techniques for
Regular and Volunteer unita, and movement methods by land and
water.

The general conclusions to be drawn from the examination

are theae:

first, that the Adjutant-General's Department was

well prepared to handle the mobilization of both Regulars and
Volunteers, and carried out this mobilization efficiently,
second, that the OUartermaster-General's Department was wellprepared to handle rail movements on the basis of prior experience in this field, established techniques for dealing with the
carriers, and sufficient time to handle the volume of traffic
without confusion, and third, that the Quartermaster-General's
Department was limited in its ability to procure and prepare
ships by a lack of funds during the period immediately before
the outbreak of war, by a lack of experience in ship chartering,
purchasing and preparation, and by a lack of time in Which to
evolve techniques and get the neeesaary preparations made.

A

further conclusion concerning the Quartermaster-General's Department is that the Department spared no effort in preparing the
ships for movement in the time allotted.

_ _=_·.,.,
.....,....

~.-UT

....J

CHAPTER III
PLANNING FOR SUPPLY AND HOUSING

I
I
i

i

!
!

OF TROOPS

The functions of supply were divided among a number of
technical service departments.

I

The Quartermaster-General,

SUrgeon-General, Chief of Ordnance and COmmissary-General of
subsistence each had a part in supplying the soldier or supplying items needed for his existence.

SUpplies for the soldier

himself came from the Ordnance and Quartermaster-General's
Departments, while necessary items like food and medicine came
from the COmmissary-General of Subsistence and the SUrgeonGeneral's Departments, respectively.
The housing function fell primarily in the area of the
Quartermaster-General, but other Departments also had interests
in this area.

The Medical and COmmissary Departments both used

tents and wagons supplied by the Quartermaster, and the Medical
Department had an interest in the sanitary organization of camps.
These functions, then, both supply and housing, were
interdepartmental in character.

Normally, coordination was accomplished at

the lowest possible level by officers of the departments involved.

!

I

During peacetime, the technical

service departments had to coordinate their operations to carry
out these functions.

I

For example, a unit surgeon needing a new hospital tent

1-_____________________
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would submit the requisition through the unit quartermaster.
unfortunately, the Army had been operating at the small unit
level, logistically speaking, for many years, and the functions
of the departments were organized on this basis.
been a

fo~tion

There had not

of a unit larger than regimental size since

the Civil War. l
The discussion of supply activities and planning will
be divided into five parts, each roughly corresponding to the
area of a particular staff department.

However, there was over-

lapping in the activities of departments, and there will therefore be overlapping in the scope of our examination.
Clothing was generally within the area of the Quartermaster's Department.
wear, and not

p~eces

By clothing is meant items of personal

of equipment.

This distinction may seem

picayune, but it is a matter of fact that while suspenders were
provided by the Quartermaster's Department, belts came from the
Ordnance Department.
The Quartermaster-General told the Dodge Commission of
the preparations made by his department and the department's
capabilities in clothing manufacture.
Question: upon the declaration of war, was the
organization and were the regulations of the
Department of such a character as to admit of the
prompt equipment • • • of troops?
Answer: The organization of the Quartermaster' s
Department at the time specified admitted of the
II
prompt equipment • • • of troops not only of the
I
Army as then constituted, but of one at least
double the size, under a condition of peace, but
not of an army!.:.en times its size under conditions
'-_____________________
-__. __Ul..~~~~j~

I

of war carried out in a foreign country.
The prevailing regulations of the Department
were fixed under statutes and orders for a peace
establishment, and in some respects the statutes
were not elastic enough to meet the rapid equipment
of a quarter of a million of men. 2

offered a series of more detailed comments, again in response to
the questions of the Dodge Commission.

For example:

Question: For an army of what size was the Department
prepared to fully supply all necessary clothing, camp
and garrison equippage [sic] on ~ril 1, l898?
Answer: The Department on the 1st of April last was
prepared to supply the existing Army and from 8,000
to 10,000 men in addition for three months. 3
The preparations of the Quartermaster's Department to
meet the approach of war are summarized i n this reply:
Question: What steps were taken for fully supplying
an army of 250,000 men with suitable clothing, camp
and garrison equipage, and what amount of material
of each had been obtained and what amount issued up
to August 31, l898?
Answer: Prior to the declaration of war, the work
of manufacture of clothing and tentage \l1a5 performed
at our depots on a scale commensurate with the needs
of the Army; a reasollable reserve stock being kept
on hand. In March last, when complications with
Spain seemed possible, this office instructed officers at manufacturing d~pota to push manufacture in
certain l i nes, and authorized additional material
for tentaga and clothing to be purchased, not, however, on an intensive scale, as the situation then
did not war.rant such action. On the 20th day of
March, the officers of the Quarte~ster's depots at
Philadelphia, New York 3 st. Louis and Chicago were
instructed to ascertain and report what number, kind
and sizes of new tents complete were on hand and
could be purchased, and how rapidly tents could be
made by principal manufacturers, if required: this
in order that a knowledge of the market might be had
in case of a hasty need of tents. Purchases were
made during the early part of April to strengthen the

IJ

stock, and about the middle of that month, the depot
quartermaster at Philadelphia was instructed to
communicate with all manufacturers and contractors
for blankets, blouse and shirting flannels, jersey,
shoes, leggings and other necessaries, and ascertain
and report at what prices and in what quantities and
by what time they can furnish them to the Department. 4
As in the case of transportation, the Department had
taken steps to find out what was available, and what it would
cost, but, since it was limited by the fund restrictions we have
already discussed, no purchases had been permitted, at least by
the middle of April.

On April 20, with war almost a certainty,

the Quartermaster's Department finally was allowed to begin purchasing items needed for clothing and equipment.

The actual pur-

chases were not effected until after war had broken out, however,
for the order of April 20 directed the depot quartermaster in
Philadelphia to advertise under five days' notice for these
terials.

Among the items to be furnished were jersey, blouse

flannel, and blouse-lining material.

On the same date, proposals

days' notice were invited for the manufacture of
lankets, shirting flannel, forage caps, drawers, leggings, ponhos, shoes, summer undershirts, pickaxes, shovels and other
' tems. S The depot quartermaster was also directed to manufacture
material he had on hand "a large number of blouses,
shirts, and trousers. ,,6

Finally, proposals were also

for the manufacture of a large quantity of material,
lothing and tentage, with an aggregate value of over three milion dollars. 7
The problem was beginning to take shape.

Limited by

L---------------------------------------------------------'----'~

McKinley's interpretation of the term "national defense," the
Quartermaster's Department could only ask what was available
until the nation stood on the brink of war, and only then begin
This meant

to get the necessary material for making uniforms.

and then made into uniforms.

Of course, under the pressure of

time, the Government had to maintain quality control of the
material given to it by private manufacturers.
material could not be obtained and variations

Some items of
f ~ om

the official

specifications had to be made, for examplel
• • • the difficulty of production ',\1as met with in
many • • • articles supplied by this Department,
particularly was it the case with sky-blue kersey
trousers, where the wool had to be dyed out of which
to manufacture the cloth from which to make the garments. Owing to the inability to get sky-blue kersey, the Department was obliged to have made some
dark blue trousers. These trousers being lighter
weight, were not equal in quality to those previously issued to regular troops, and were not desired
by the troops on account of difference in color. 8
An additional statement on the problem of quality con-

trol also is of interest.
During all this rush, the Department was obliged to
be most vigilant to prevent articles of inferior
quality being imposed upon the Government. To this
end, a large corps of inspectors had to be employed,
and they in turn watched.~
Thus far, although the clothing of troops has been discussed, the subject of their equipment continually intrudes.
Both in clothing and equipment, the problem of "lead-time" had
to be dealt with.

Even with the prompt placement of orders,

delivery times were so far into the future that
Lo-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _~~.,.,...
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of the Army could not be met.
The clothing supply function includes, in addition to
the procurement and manufacturing aspects, which have been discussed, that of distribution.

As

the volunteer units assembled,

this distribution problem moved to the fore.

The regular units

had enough supplies to tide them over, because they were required to have thirty days' supplies on hand at all times.
interest of speed governed the procedures which followed.

The
The

office of the Quartermaster-General took action to insure that
clothing would be available at the points of mobilization.

Af-

ter the war, the Quartermaster-General summarized these actions
for the Dodge Commission:
Without waiting for requisitions or requests of any
sort, supplies in kind and quantity judged by this
office likely to be required were shipped in bulk
to the various points of concentration, and the depot
quartermasters there urged from time to time to inform the Quartermaster-General as the supply of any
particular article ran low. IO
Of course, the calculations of the officers in the office
of the Quartermaster-General had to take into account clothing
which had been issued to the states.

They assumed, since they

had no means of finding out (states were not required to report
such information) that state troops were completely uniformed.
• • • we depended a good deal on what the States
were going to bring in, and we were very much disappointed that the troops were not equipped. With
few exceptions, the different State troops were
not well equipped. ll
With the above statements in mind, it is not too difficult to imagine the confusion which must have resulted from the

I
!

I
~

j

simultaneous arrival of the troops and their uniforms, and their

1

resultant efforts to put the two together.

!

The confusion is

~

well described by the harried chief quartermaster at Chickamauga

II

in his reply to a question asking why the troops were not imme-

II

diately uniformed.

!!

It is not at all singular that there should be a lack of
uniforms in a large body of enlisted men--45 regiments-thrown into camp from civil life, all within two weeks,
and inspected before they had an opportunity to be supplied. The work has been pushed with the utmost vigor,
every officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department
(three in all) working fully eighteen hours a day to
accomplish it. The Quartermaster-General can judge from
the amount of clothing sent what a task it must have been
to issue it to green troops, wholly unaccustomed to forms
and usages. 12
The next area of consideration is one which involved a
good deal of controversy both during and after the war, namely,
that of weapons.

The Regular

Army

had just been equipped with

a modern amokeless powder rifle, the .30 caliber Rrag-Jorgenson.
However, the Volunteers had, with few exceptions, the older,
black powder .45 caliber Springfield. 13
At the beginning of the war, the

Army

had "only 67,000

rifles and carbines of modern pattern on hand ... 14

Roughly half !
!

of these were in the hands of the Regular Army, leaving slightly

I!

more than thirty thousand weapons with which to equip the Vo1un- I
teers.

Needless to say, all of the Volunteers could not be

equipped with the new weapons.
What about the planning carried out by the ordnance
Department?

What had they done in preparation for the war?

Like the OUartermaster's Department, the Ordnance Department

little idea as to the size of the force they would be called on
to arm.

The Chief of Ordnance stated:

• • • I always counted on a little warning. If I could
have had a month's warning and been that month ahead, I
would have had those stores ready faster than they were
demanded, no matter how early demanded, but still I would
have had them on handf but, as it was, we were a little
behind the demand all the time~15
The ordnance Department also placed some reliance in the
weapons the Volunteers would be bringing with them.

Its plan-

j

I
!j

i

ning was done with this in mind, although there was some skepticism as to the completeness of their equipment.

Again, the

states were not required to report the condition or quantity of

II
~

lcheir weapons.
When it was determined to callout the volunteers, I found
I had this matter to look out for. It was stated to me
that they were to take the National Guard equipment. The
National Guard was supposed to be armed and equipped. You
remember they have an inspector, an officer stationed in
each State, and we relied on his reports, and we had reports that they would be ready to take the field. I did
not rely entirely upon it, and made provisions to supply
them. I was met by this difficulty as to these arms:
They were furnished to the states under the law for arming
and equipping thg militia, and some of the states bought
their own arms. l
When the Army decided to send the Volunteer Regiments
to Camp Thomas at Chickamauga, the Chief of Ordnance had to make
the necessary plans and recommendations for ordnance supply.
His recommendation that an ordnance depot be located at Camp
Thomas was disregarded, with the result that:
The greatest difficulty and confusion in the supply and
equipment of the troops was experienced at Camp Thomas.
The Chief of ordnance had recommended the establishment
of a depot at that place, but his recommendation was not
complied with, the general commanding the camp not

I

concurring because of the proximity of the arsenal at
COlumbia, Tennessee, which arsenal, however, was soon used
for other purposes. Had such depot been established the
confusion and delays in the matter of equipment of the
troops there would undoubtedly have ~een much lessened. 17
The procurement of weapons was a problem area.

The

amount of weapons on hand at the beginning of the war has been
mentioned.

More weapons were ordered at the beginning of the

war, but by the time they were delivered, the actual fighting
was almost over.

In order to speed the issue of weapons to the

volunteer units, the units were requested to forward to the
office of the Chief of Ordnance a list of the total number of
men and the total number of weapons.

Using this list, the ord-

nance Department could then determine the amount of additional
weapons needed, and could ship them to the point of mobilization.

The hitches developed when the weapons had to be issued,

due to the lack of ordnance personnel at places like Camp Thomas,

I
I
time.

and the confusion existing as a result of vast quantities of all
types of &upplies arriving at the same point within a short
The procurement of weapons was a re Rul t of the

Arnl}"

s

decision to adopt a rifle which used smOkeless powder, and which
would give the soldier the capability of multiple shots without
reloading.

The weapon which was adopted in 1892, the Krag-

Jorgensen, carried the official military designation of "U.S.
Magazine rifle, caliber .30."

Its adoption was a result of

trials of most of the existing foreign breech actions.

Between

1892 and 1898, several small modifications were made, which, in
accordance with Army practice, resulted in the designation of
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rifles so modified as new models.
Model 1892, 1894, and 1898.

Xrag-Jorgensens were made in

The weapon was actually made in

both rifle and carbine form, for use by infantry and cavalry.
The rifle had a 30-inch barrel, and the carbine a 22-inch barrel.

In addition to the Krags, the Army's large stock of .45

caliber Spring fields were issued, since a smokeless powder cartridge had been developed for use with them. 18
Several references have already been made to the adoption and use of weapons firing amokeless powder cartridges.

Department Was that of providing a large enough quantity of

use of smokeless powder were simple enough.

I

I

One i

of the greatest supply problems encountered by the Ordnance

smokeless powder for the weapons to be used.

J

The reasons for

ii

II
!i

If you had a black- '

powder weapon, you gave away your position with your first shot.
If you had a smokeless powder weapon, you could remain invisible 1
'!'he Spanish in CUba were armed with the Model 1898 Mauser, which !~
fired a smokeless powder cartridge, and it would have been suicidal to send men armed with a black-powder weapon into combat
against them, especially in jungle terrain.
'!'he necesaity for speed caused by the short notice given !~
to the Ordnance Department and the time necesaary to prepare to
make the new type of powder made it imperative for the Chief of
Ordnance to decide which type of cartridge would be supplied
first, the .45 or the .30.

The .45 cartridge had not been fully

tested yet but the .30 was ready for mass production.

!

I

He decided

to have the .30 made first, and then later to furnish the .45,

as supplies of amokeless powder became available.
• • • I at first gave up getting smokeless powder for the
.
caliber .45 cartridges, and we gave up very largely getting
smokeless powder for our coast defense works, but I inI
sisted upon it for our field and siege artillery and the
I
caliber .30 cartridges. In about two months, I think, I
1
was able to get the smokeless powder for the caliber .45,
and after that all Og the caliber .45 were made of smokeless powder nearly.l

I

I

,

The two-month time delay mentioned in the quotation abov~

I

I

was enough to insure that no .45 caliber smokele.s powder ammunition was available for the expedition to CUba.

I

The Chief of Ordnance, Brigadier General D. W. Flagler,

I

I

was a Civil War veteran, and he put his experience to good us.
in planning.

We have already noted hi. skepticism about the

amount of equipment the volunteer unit. brought to active .ervice.
I

He stated, concerning planning, that - •• • all the plana

have made and all of the study

I

have given to the subject

I

I
i
!

have based them on my experience in the civil war. 1120
Once again speed was the determining factor.

I

The Ord-

I
.1

nance Department never caught up with the demand for weapons,
or supply of ammunition, until it was too late to make much difference.

The reason for this delay may be found in the fact

that, here as in many other government departments, no concrete
commitments could be made, and although such information was
gathered, this was of limited value as far as actual production
of weapons went.

Artillery weapons have been passed over with

only one mention because of the fact that such weapons required
an even longer time for production, and hence, to an even
'----------------------~-----
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greater extent than with infantry and cavalry weapons, artillery

~

I

I
i

pieces were not received in time to make much difference.
The food supply of the Army was the responsibility of
the Commissary-General of Subsistence.

In reply to the ques-

tions of the Dodge COmmission, he told of the conditions existing in his department at the start of the war.
Question: On April 1, 1898, an Army of what size was the
SUbsistence Department prepared to fully supply with officers and the necessary field rations • • • 1
Answer. The number of Subsistence officerR in service
April 1, 1898, including the Commissary-General and his
office assistants, was 22. This number, if they had all
been ordered in the field, would have been sufficient to
properly officer with subsistence officers one army corps,
consisting of the maximum enlisted strength authorized by
Section 9, act of April 22, and one army corps of twothirds maximum enliated strength authorized by that section. From the stores on hand in the storehouses at the
various military posts at that time, and with such stores
as could have been hurriedly purchased before quitting the
duties they were engaged upon, the officers of the Subsistence Department could probably have supplied an army of
75,000 or 80,000 men with field rations for a period of
sixty days. The duties which they left behind would have
had to be taken up and diacharged by others before the
lapa. of that period, however, as the duties of purchasing
and shipping stores for an army engaged in active operations cannot be left unprovided for, nor efficiently provided for by officers who are integral parts of the active
moving forces. 21
Thus the Department could have supplied the army of
75,000 to 80,000 men only by stripping its offices of every
officer.

But in so doing, the Department would have rendered

itself incapable for further service because of the lack of
trained personnel to direct operations from the office of the
Commissary-General.

The choice which had to be made waa clear,

either pullout all the officers, and supply a small army for

~-----------------------------------------------------,~~

sixty days efficiently or leave them in office, and trust that
the large army would be able to handle the supplies of food with

a minimum of trained technical help.

The Regulars could be ex-

pected to deal with their problems on the basis of past experience, but Volunteer unit. had no such experiencea to draw on.
Prom a point of hindsight vantage, the decision can still be
defended, since the army to be supplied was over 80,000, in fact
over 150,000 with the inclusion of McRinley'a April 22 call.
The preparation and planning accomplished by the
Department before the war alre outlined in the answer of the
Commissary-General to another question of the Dodge COmmission.
Question, Between April 1, 1898, and August 31, 1898,
what arrangements were made for fully supplying with
food an army of 250,000 men serving in the field and in
camp?
Answer: The purchasing commissaries on duty in the principal purchasing centers of the country were already established on April 1, and received their orders from the
Commissary-General of SUbsistence on the breaking out of
hostilities for the procurement and shipment of all subsistence supplies, except fresh beef and freah bread,
needed by the various camp. and in the field. These supplies were forwarded to sUbaistence field depots located
contiguous to the troops assembled in large bodi.s, the
officers in charge of which purchaaed the fresh beef and
fresh bread needed. These depots were placed in charge
of officers of the regular e.tablishment who had had experience in the purchase of handling of supplies in large
quanti tie.. '!'he lawa and regulations governing the purchase and accountability for supplies are intricate and
exacting, and the full duties connected with this branch
of the bu8iness of the SUbsistence Department are not
properly to be entrusted to newly appoint~d officer8, especially thos. devoid of previous military training or
wanting in experience in the transaction of governmental
business connected with the Army.
The duty of obtaining from the field depots the specific articles of food which the enlisted men are entitled
to belongs to those SUbsistence officers who are a8.igned
to duty on the staffs of Corps, divi8ion and brigade com!
missarias, and to the commanders of companies, ~~~!..~. . . .._J

organizations. It is their duty, as an integral part
of the combatant forces to look out for the wants of
the enlisted men and make timely requisitions on the
field depots for the food supplies • • • .22
The above statement is perhaps the best single outline
of the logistical system for any supply service.

The Technical

Service Department gave the orders for procurement of quantities
necessary to support the amount of troops on hand, the technical
service officers in depots at the points of mobilization broke
this amount down into quantities for the individual units they
were supporting, and then the matter passed to those officers
who were appointed to staff jobs in the units, as well as the
commanders of these units who had the responsibility of requesting the correct amounts of supplies to support their operations.
With minor exceptions caused by the types of supplies involved,
this was the system used throughout the Army establishment.

In

peacetime, the Technical Service Department provided qualified
officers down to the staff level in the departments covering the
various geographical areas, and the commanders placed their requisitions through these officers.

The difference is that in

wartime, the peace establishment was not able to expand rapidly
enough to place officers who were technically qualified down to
the levels of corps, division and brigade.

The War Department

held the qualified officers at higher headquarters so that maximum use could be made of their experience.

This gap between the

technically qualified officers who were found in higher headquarters or in depots, and the units they were supporting was

II
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filled by appointees from civil life.

i1

When the pre-embarkation

and embarkation is discussed, these problems will be seen and

I
i!

considered in detail.
The Commissary-General of Subsistence, like all of the

I

other technical department heads, had to arrange for the expansion of his staff to meet the needs of the

Army.

Obviously, the 1

i

twenty-two officers of his staff had to have more help in order
.
,I
to deal with the many problema which were arising_ He describes i

I

this operation as follows I

A large body of officers for staff duty was added to the
SUbsistence Depa~ent by appointments made under the act
of congre.s. 1'hey were amply supplied from the field
depot., and after food supplies for the soldiers had been
drawn by them [line officers] from the depots those supplies were under the control of the commanding generals
and their staffs and were as much in the possession of
the troops as were the wa90ns, horses and other facilities '
necessary for their distribution among the men. The
Commissary-General of Subsistence could exercise no direct
control over the stores nor the officers after issue except to require the officers to render accountability
papers showing whether the disposition of the stores was
warranted by law, regulations, and proper orders, and to
cause the officers to be charged with the money value in
the case of any improper application on their part shown
by the accountability papers. 23
.
The problem of the technical service departments was

I

!

complicated by the fact that, because of their position as staff i

Z

officers they could only recommend, not order, actions which
they thou9ht necessary.

What happened when the recommendation

of the Chief of Ordnance regarding establishment of a depot at
Camp

Thomas was disregarded by the cOmmanding General of that

l

~

!

place has already been described.
In the area of equipment there was a division in
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responsibility all the way from procurement to final issue to
the soldier.

Certain i taus of equipment were the responsibility

I!

of the Ordnance Department, and the only time the ouartermaster's l
Department had anything to do with them was in the tranaportation phase.
At first glance, this problem does not seem to be too
complex.

In a 109ical approach, each technical service depart-

lIlant would handle thoae items pertaining to its area.

I!
I
I
,j

i

!
I

'!'he prob- i

1_ arises when the decision must be made as to what area a particular item falls into.

J

This problem was brought up before the

I

!

I
I

Dodge Commission in the following words.
A soldier now, in order to get a meal, must make requisitions on three different departments of the government
and have three different requisitions approved?24
It was true.

The ovens and other necessary cooking

utensils were drawn from the Olartermaster, while the soldier's
individual eating utensils came from ordnanc e, and the food, of
course, from the Commissary of SUbsistence.
'!'he Ordnance Department made many of the i tams it was
responsible for, and had been preparing to make more of them
before the war starteCl.

'!'his preparation had been delayed by

the refusal of Congress to grant an appropriation for machinery
to be used in a new ordnance plant.
'!'he Department did not have on hand at the beginning of
the war any large supply of infantry, cavalry, artillery
and horse equipments. '!'he buildings for a plant for their
manufacture had been erected at Rock Island Arsenal, but
the plant itself had not been installed through failure to
obtain the necessary appropriation.
In the first issues of equipments to troops there was

I
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some delay caused by the lack of proper plant for their
manufacture, and as they were not on the market as art~
cles of commerce, they could not be purchased at once. S

~

,
1

!

II

The items referred to were things such as cartridge

I

belts, ammunition pouches, and the various types of packs and
pack straps.

SUbstitutes were tried, but they proved unservice- I

!

able.

i

The OUartermaster's Department ran into trouble in the
supplying of land transportation equipment in the
mules, wagons, harnesses, and saddles.

fo~

of

I

horses~

I

Before the start of the

i

war, the Quartermaster's Department directed its quartermaster
to query major manufacturers of wagons, saddles, and harnesses
to determine what price. would be, how long it would take to
deliver them in quantity, and similar information. 26

No orders

were placed, however, and once again the government had to face
up to the phenomenon known as "lead time," that is, the amount
of time to develop or manufacture an item from first order or
design to final delivery .
ment had 1,198 wagons

At the start of the war the govern-

I

and 4,963 sets of harness on hand.

Of course, animals were needed to pull the wagons, and
their procurement was also a source of difficulty.

I
I

Before the

war, boards of Regular Army officers representing line and

i
!

Now, under the stress of war, only individual Quartermaster

i
i

officers could be spared to do this purchasing.

I

Quartermaster officers had made all purchase. of public animals.

I
!

Added to the

i

wear and tear on these officers was the change in quantities

!

I
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animals
declined
needed. Average prices paid for government
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from the period July 1, 1897 to March 31, 1898 during the period
of the war.
decline.

~

1

A few examples will serve to illustrate this

cavalry horses had been bought at an average cost of

,

$126.15 during the earlier period, and sold during the War at

I

$100.42 on the average.

!

Artillery and draft horses showed simi-

~

lar price changes, with the artillery beasts going from $137.79
average to $130.85, and draft animals dropping from $148.11 to
$125.38.

However, there was one area in which prices did in-

crease, namely that of mules.

i

Before the war, draft mules were

being obtained for an average $99.84 and pack mules for an average

$72~93.

With the outbreak of hostilities, prices went up to

$110.05 for draft mules and $83.15 for pack mules. 27

Several

officers testified that quantity buying reduced the prices paid
for horses.

Officers buying mules, however, discovered collu-

sion among dealers to drive prices up.
During the course of the war, the Army also procured.
vast amounts of wagons and harness sets.

Por the period of the

$478,111.10, and 28,012 sets of harnesses for a total of

II

$358,449.18.

I

war, 5,179 wagons of various types were bought for a total of

Average costs of the wagons varied from $66.28

for a farm wagon to $260.26 for a spring wagon. 28

However, most

I

ii
i

of these items did not arrive in time for use in the combat
phases of the war.
To pull these wagons and the ambulances needed by the

I
,

Medical Department, the government purchased 16,618 horsea and
20,182 mules.

By the end of the war, 16,483 horses and 19,550
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mules had been issued to troops. 29
The actual issuing of equipment by both Ordnance and
Quartermaster's Departments followed the procedure commented on
in our discussion of the Subsistence Department.

Equipment pro-

cured was sent to the point of issue, and officers of the

as was the case with the ordnance supplies at Camp Thomas, or
to staff officers at sub-depots such a8 the ones established
for ordnance and quartermaster supplies at Tampa.
One area of equipment which haa not been covered is that
of tentage, which has been ignored in order to include it in our
discussion of troop housing.
The final area of equipment is that of medical supplies.
pr~ar

given by the Dodge COmmission's final report.

,

I
I
i

Depa~

ment on the spot handled the issue either directly to line unit.

A concise summary of the Department's

I

preparations is
-Prior to the

declaration of war, no preparation for the approaching conflict
had been made by the Medical Department. ,,30 However, judgement
should be reserved at least until we have noted the problems
under which the department had to operate in the area of logistics.
The medical supplies on hand were only what remained at
the post of the semi-annual issue of the preceding
January, the several purveying depots at New York, st.
Louis, and San Francisco not having as yet received any
of the medicines and stores contracted for in anticipation
of the regular i.sue of the coming July. Models of improved medical and hospital chests had been determined
upon, but no contracts for such chests had been given,
nor was it thought that bids for them could be legally
asked for.
The need of a hoapi tal ship had been made known to the

Il

I
l

I

j
I

i

i
Secretary of War, but no steps had been taken to secure
1
such vessel. only $20,000 had been given to the DepartI
ment out of the $50,000,000 emergency fund, and the Secretary of War had directed the surgeon-General to make no
\
purchases until the question of whether or not there was
I
to be war had been definitely settled. 3l
i

I

I
!

Obviously, little preparation could be accomplished with

,

, the Secretary of War forbidding expenditures but little Planning !
seems to have been done, for it was not until May that the
Surgeon-General realized how great the shortages were, and took

f
~i

the first stepa to insure that the troops then being mobilized
would have the necessary medical supplies on hand.
The several .upply depots having but little material on
hand, the Surgeon General on the lrd of May telegraphed
the governors of the various state. asking that their
troops might take with them the medical and hospital supplies belonging to them as national guard organizations.
Sixteen of the States were found to be without such supplies and a large number of the others had them in but
limited quantities, so that moat of the volunteer regiment. i
on arrival at camp Thomas ~~ camp Alger had neither medi- !
cines nor hospital stores.

I

Once again the Regular Army had assumed that the Nationru.
Guard would have certain i tams on hand, and once again this was
not true.

Tbe cries of st ate politicians and guard officers

that their troop. were ready were in part responsible for this
error.

However, since these troops were now part of the federal

foroe., little could be done except to order the necessary supplies and hope that they would come to the units in time for

!
!

effective use.
The words of the Dodge Commission report once again fur-

I

niah a vivid statement of the logistical problema, and the list- :
ing for the Medical Department is indeed comprehensive.

1 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
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~
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What were the ransons for the existence of these wants?
In the first place the almost absolute lack of any supplies in store when the war broke out. Medicines could be
purchased in any quantity and without delay, as could bedding and certain articles of hospital furniture, but other
articles of adopted pattern, as surgical instrument. or
cots of special design, could not. Time was lost in having
manufactured standard chests of various kinds to contain
drugs, stores dressings, furniture, etc., and the making
of these articles never kept up with the demand for them.
Next, the too restricted supply table, which might very
properly have had upon it a number of drugs in common use
in civil life, the issue of which had not been authorized
by the Medical Department of the Army.
Next, the lack of knowledge on the part of untrained
medical officers how to get what they needed when it was
on hand and ready for issue.
Next, the unwise restrictions put upon medical officers
by chief surgeons, notably at Camp Thomas, as respects the
form of requisitions and the articles that might be called
for.
Next, the taking away of regimental supplies to fit up
division hospital., and the issue of medicines to regiments
only through these hospitals.
Next, the actual want of supplies at local depots or the
difficulty of getting them out of such depots on approved
requisitions.
Next, the necessary draining of scantily supplied depots
to fit out troops about t.o move. 33
!
I

The comment concerning the inability of the Department

I

cent of the comment of the Olief of Ordnance concerning ordnance

II

i terns of equipment.

interesting point is the remark about

I

the lack of knowledge of requisitioning and issue procedures.

~

to make enough supplies to keep up with the demand is reminis-

An

~

It highlights an area seldom mentioned by either primary or
secondary works, the preparation of the volunteer officer for
active service.

Medical officers of volunteers often found con-

ditions with the

Army

in the field considerably different from

their comfortable practices at home, and few doctors had the

!!

training
supervise
operations
insure
' -_
_ _ _ _necessary
_ _ _ _ _to
__
_ _ _ _ _sanitation
____ _ _
_ _ ____ and
_
_J
~

~~

healthful conditions for the troops in their units.

The requi-

8itioning of supplies necessary for such operations falls into
the category we are discussing.

The system of requisitioning

was not sufficiently flexible to deal with non-atandard items,
, and often requisitions were returned for administrative rather
than medical reasons.
Mention of the depot system of operations for medical
logistics is seen.

The problems again seem to be the same, too

few officers, too few supplies

alld

I
j

i
J

not enough time.

I

The next area of discussion is that of troop housing.

I

This disaussion divides itself naturally into two parts, discus-

.ion of sites and their choosing, and discussion of the material

I

available for housing the troops, that is, tentage.

I

nation of the

pro~lem

~

OUr exami-

I

of site choice. has been limited to the

camp areas in the south where the troops who moved to Tampa were !
stationed before the move.

i!

The selection of the sites, it will

be remembered, had in some cases, notably those of Chickamauga

and Tampa, been entrusted to the chief quartermasters of the

I
I

departments at the same time the Regular Army was mobilized. 34
However, there were larger reasons behind the selection of
Tampa, which will bear examination.

The Secretary of War, R.A.

Alger, explained his reasons for choosing Tampa as one of the
points of assembly.
Question: Why was Tampa selected as the base of operation.s ?
Answer: on account of the shipping facilities at that
;
point and its coraparative short distance from CUba, render- I.
ing any movement of the troops p08sible on short notice a~ !
I

the progress of the blockade or any other sudden condition
might require. J5

,r
1

~

!

An interesting point is developed a little later in

.\

I•

Secretary Alger's statement, when he says, " • • • A permanent
camp was never contemplated at Tampa ... J6

Thus the invasion port, '

which was also a point of assembly, was selected because of its
proximity to CUba, and the fact that it had railroad facilities,
but the Army never intended to use it for a long-term camp.

In

the discussion of the pre-embarkation and embarkation phases it
will be seen that the

Army

had erred in its estimate of Tampa'.

utility a. a shipping point.
temporary.

The camp facilities were indeed

Before discussing the nature of these facilities,

especially in the area of housing, the selection of some of the
other points should be discussed.
A general cOllll1'lent on the reasons for selection of the
southern camps at Fernandina, Jacksonville, and Tampa again
reinforce what we have just said about Tampa and transportation.

II
I

!

Question: Why were summer camps organized at Pernandina,
Jacksonville, and Tampa?
Answer: All of the early camps in the South were selected
with special regard for the health of the troops ~9 their
convenience for prompt movement by rail and water.

II

The use of Chickamauga Park was an assembly area for

!,

j

I;

troops had been envisioned when the park area of 7,000 acres
was set aside.

This camp, like those at Tampa, New orleans,

Mobile, and later camps in the north, was covered by the chief
quartermasters of geographical departments, who selected the

I
!

I
I!
!
.1
-~

camp sites, and made a general report on the area, the railroads !
i

____

f
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usable, the water supply, and other items of interest to the
Army.

1

I
I
!
i

Secretary Alger listed his reasons for assembling troops
in large camps in his book on the Spanish-American War.

'!'he

comments are intended to be general, but they have particular

I

I
;

?

significance for the camps at Chickamauga and Tampa, which were

I

the largest, and about which many complaints were made.

.
i

!
The War Department has been criticized for assembling so
many troops in large camps. The reasons for such action
may be stated as follows I
1. The supply bureaus could not establish in each of
the forty-five state. depots for rationing volunteers
during the period required to manufacture and ship equipment for thea. rec:rui ts. Moreover, there were not enough
Regular Army officers in the Quartermaster's, Commissary,
Medical, and Ordnance Departments to detail one of each
kind to so many scattered State camps, and Regular Army
officers alone at that time were qualified to do the work.
2. It was desirable to place volunteer regiments in
camps with regulars, in order that the former might have
the example and instruction that seasoned troops might
furnish.
3. It was deemed undesirable to have volunteer organizations remain in their own states any longer than was
absolutely necessary for the mustering-in process, in that
home influences tended to retard military discipline.
4. Imnlediate drill in brigade, division, and corps
manoeuvres was of the first importance, as the experience
of the Civil War had demonstrated this could only be
accomplished in large camps of instruction.
S. Considerations of national moment, which subsequent i
events proved wis., suggested the brigading of regiments,
!
not from the same State, but from the four great geographi- I
cal divisions-North, South, East and West. 38

I

I
I

I

I

It is worth emphasizing that the first reason mentioned
by the Secretary is that of logistics, and that his comments
reinforce the information we have developed concerning the
several departments, namely, that they were not able to cover
all of the areas where they might profitably have been used.

The selection of the camps was made with another object
in mind, one which was assumed by all to such an extent that it
is not even mentioned in any reports, correspondence or memoranda.

This was the basic assumption that all of the unite

would be living in tents.

One writer does mention a western

governor who would not let his men camp in tents in the field
because they would get wet if it rained. 39

The problem of

i

1

l
ti

1

I

tentage was one which was of such magnitude that the Quartermaster-General commented.

"The chief difficulties were in

getting t ent age • • • • .40

!
j

!

I
!

The Quartermaster's Department had made preparations for i

I

providing tentage within the limits imposed by President
McKinley's interpretation of ·national defense," spending no

money, but asking what was available, in case of war.

I
I
i!

the 26th day of March, the officers of the quartermaster
depots at Philadelphia, New Yon, St. Louis, and Chicago
t
were instructed to ascertain and report what number, kind I
and sizes of new tents complete were on hand and could be
purchased, and how rapidly tents could be made by principal ··
manufacturers, if required, this in order that knowledge ~f I
the market might be had in case of a hasty need of tents.
~
On

I

The Quartermaster-General was questioned on the amount

I

i~

of material available at the start of the war during the hearinga
~

of the Dodge COmmission.

i
lj

~

)

Question. '1'0 What extent was the standard cotton duck used !
in the manufacture of tent. on hand and at the outbreak of I
the war • • • in the market.
f
Answer. Well, as aoon as the trouble became very probable, i
or, at all events, when the war was declared, I sent around
to different dealers and bought all the duck I could buy,
and I don't think that exceeded over 200,000 yards, that
is, to the beat of my recollection.
Question: Did the manufacturers anticipate trouble to any
,

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~____¥~_~_n_Tu_ _ _ _ _ _~~M~~

extent and beg i n to manufacture all these things?
Answer a I do not think so. '!'hey kept on hand a large
stock of what is merchantable duck in the general market.
You can get that, but our duck is made up from specifications, and, of course, they don't keep any very large
quantity of it on hand.
Question a It is rather a better quality than what is made
for the general market?
Answer a Better duck.42
The records of the Quartermaster-General's office are

!
\

very detailed on the subject of tentage, and material for making

I

tents.

I

The merchantable duck purchased was no doubt suitable

for short-term camping, but not for extended field use.

The

reference of the Quartermaster-General to a purchase of approxi-

!
',;

I

I

I

mately 200,000 yards of duck may refer to one of two types pur- I
chased during the period May 1 through August 30.

The records

indicate that 230,000 yards of 12-ounce duck were ordered during
this period, and 180,000 yards of 10-ounce duck. 43
Generally speaking, the ouartermaster's Department was
not well prepared in the way of tentage at the start of the war.

on hand as of April 1 were 1,761 common tents, 325 conical wall
tents, 218 hospital tents, 9,863 shelter halves, 487 wall tents
and 71 tents of various other kinds.

In

addition to these

tents, the Army had on contract for delivery or manufacture 763
common tents, 278 conical wall tents, 148 hospital tents, 6,519
shelter halves, 411 wall tents, and none of the miscellaneous
types. 44

The Department had been making tents, but its capacity

was not great enough to meet the demand.

During the period

April 30 through August 15, the Quartermaster depots manufactured 4,923 common tents, 24 conical wall tents, 426 hospital

I

I
I.•
!

I
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~ tents, 197,502 shelter halves and 668 wall tents.

By
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compari-

son, during the same period, the government had to contract for
or purchase 43,077 common tents, 716 conical wall tents, 5,920
hospital tents, 174,877 shelter halves and 7,982 wall tents.
In

addition, some 1,244 irregular tent. were also purchased or
i

contracted for during this period. 45

1

1

These figure. indicote that in every category except

I

that of shelter halves, the government had to depend on industry

I

to produce more than it had been doing_

!l

Why was the government

able to outproduce industry on shelter halves?

The reason was

that the government had prepared to produce many of these with
the expectation of field service.

The other tents were of de-

signa generally available, while the shelter halves were an
excluaively military item.
OUestion. How soon, General, were you able to meet the
demand for tents?
Answer. Well, we met the demand right along as beat we
could. We at once began to puah forward especially the
manufacture of shelter tents, becaus!6that waa the equipment for an army in the field • • •
This preparation for the production of ahelter halvea
included getting the necesaary material, which proved to be a
problem area.
Question. Is the material out of which shelter tents are
made- must that be manufactured?
Answer a Yes, we have a specification for that, but we got
as much of it as we could, and we took as much of other
suitable kinds aa we could get. There seemed to be a good
deal of trouble in getting suitable material.
Question: It is heavier, of course, than anything that i.
called muslin, but not so heavy aa canvas.
Answer. The point was to get an article that would shed
water, and you have to get a very closely woven duck or

drill to do that.
Question, What is the standard material, is it drill, or
plain white duck?
Answer a It is plain white duck, but we bought a great
deal of4~rill, too. It is questionable which is the
better.
During the period May 1 thru JUne 30, the Army ordered
562,828 yards of what is described as Yshelter tent material,Y
with an additional 534,828 yards being ordered by August 15. 48
Hospital tents were an item which was needed by the
Army, but as we noted above, the quantity on hand was 218, with
148 more on contract.

Again questions were asked as to the

supply of this item.
Question a As to the hospital tents, what supply had you
on hand at the outbreak of war, and how soon were you able
to meet the demands of the troops in the field for a full
equipment in that respect?
Answer. • • • we did not have many, but there never was a
time that I could not meet the demand for hospital tents
that I know of, and I do not recollect a single application which was approved by the Surgeon-General which was
not met by us. 4§here might have been in the beginning,
for a few days.
The issue of suppliea ia an area which is critical to
the examination which ia being conducted.

The facta available

for tentage are complete enough so that a aingle item can be
traced down to the issue to depots, aa an illustration of how
the system worked.
Between May 1 and JUne 30, 1898, the Quartermaster's
Department isaued 1,722 hospital tents to the Army aa a whole.
Of this total, 306 were issued to Jacksonville, 753 to
Chickamauga, 16 to Miami, 202 to Tampa, 35 to Key West, and
50 to Fernandina.

This issues totalled 1,362 hospital tents,

or all but 360 of the tents issued to the ArmY.SO

It appears

that the troops who were closest to the points of embarkation
were being supplied.

Even if we did not already know that most

of the Regular Army was at Tampa, and forty-five regiments of
volunteers were at Chickamauga, with other smaller units scattered at points like Jacksonville, Miami, Key West, and Fernandina,
we would be able to guess that most of the Army was at the
points mentioned by looking at the supply figures from which
our information about hospital tents have been drawn.
A general comparison of the figures for issues and the
number of tents purchased indicates that the tents were going
out to the troops.

In fact, for the period May 1 thru June 30,

the issues exceed the amounts purchased, reflecting the depletion of the Army's stock on hand.
master-C~neral

The testimony of the Quarter-

indicates that, in general, the units of the

Regular Army had the full allowance of tentage at the start
of the war. Sl

This would mean that the bulk of the issues

were being made to the volunteers.

The total issue figures of

the Quartermaster's Department tend to support this, with most
of the issues being directed to the depot at Chickamauga, where
the volunteers were assembling in great numbers.

Tampa runs a

close second to Chickamauga in total volume handled, but the
amounts run only 30 to 50 percent of the totals for ChiCkamauga.
This would aeem to indicate that the quantities flowing i nt o
Tampa were going to the equipping of the volunteers there.
Some of theae regiments had already been equipped, for instance,

the Seventy-First New York, and the First Volunteer Cavalry
(Rough Riders).

The Seventy-First brought their tents with

them from New York, and the Rough Riders moved to Tampa from
their rendezvous at San Antonio, Texas, where they had been
living in tents.

However, as the cautious note of our conunents

above indicate, it is not possible to state positively that the
bulk of issues were going to the volunteers, because the records
of the Quartermaster-General's office show only iS8ues to
depots, and the information needed i8 only to be found in the
records of those depots, which do not seem to have survived.
What is significant about this analysis is that the
depot system was functioning and units were receiving issues
of tentage with a8 little delay as pos8ible.
The activities of the various technical service
departments have been reviewed and the problems occurring in
the supply and housing areas listed.

Throughout this treat-

ment, incidental references have been made to Tampa as supply
depot, railhead, port, etc.

The situation at Tampa during the

pre-embarkation and embarkation phases i8 the next area for
consideration.

During the discussion, some of the points made

in the examination thus far will again be mentioned, with the
result of an earlier decision shown in actual action.

In

order to keep the treatment organized, the same general areas
of discussion will be treated, that is, transportation, supply,
and housing.

In addition, references will be made to the

discussion of mobilization.

CHAPTER IV
SURVEY OF RESULTS IN PRE-EMBAlU(A'l'ION
AND EMBAlU(ATION

The stage has been set.

The troops have been mobilized

or mustered, the mechanics of their arming, equipping, feeding
and moving have been discussed and the apparatus for getting
medicine described.

The preparations made to get this force

supplied have been discussed as well as the problems which
existed in this regard.

The ultimate test of the organization

described is their functioning in the movement of an army to
war.

After this, the lessons learned from it will be described,

and the effect of these lessons on the men, the plans, and the
organization of the Army.
In the section on troop housing, the reasons for the
choice of Tampa as an assembly point and invasion port were
described.
order.

Some further description of the area seems to be in

F. E. ChadwiCk gives an excellent view of the area in

his Relations of the

u.s. and

Spainl

Tampa, selected as the base for the army which it was
expected to send to CUba, is on a shallow arm of Tampa
Bay, in a perfectly flat district of coral sand, covered
at this time with open forests of moderate-sized pines.
From the sandy and absorbent character of the soil, and
the shade offered by the park-like distribution of the
pines, it was in many ways an ideal point for a large
camp. The vast and palatial Tampa Bay Hotel, the only

building of value (separated by an arm of the bay from the
small town, made up of cheap wooden structures used as
cigar factories, in which most of the employees were
eubans) was an important element as affording excellent
headquarters. Ten miles southwest was Tampa Fort, the
head of navigation, and the terminus of the railway.
This was the point of departure of the Plant Line of
steamers for Key West and Havana. The railway was the
property of Mr. Plant, under whose able administration
the district had been developed • • • • The chief draw- 1
back was the heat of the district at this seaaon • • • •
Chadwick's description is the only one in either primary
or secondary literature that gives a capsule view of the area.
Most other mentions are in testimony taken at Tampa by the Dodge
Commission, which was able to see the arrangement of things for
itself, and they

t~nd

to skip details.

The Dodge Commission was

interested in obtaining an idea of the climate, terrain, and
living conditions in the Tampa area, and in order to get this
information it interviewed a local resident, Colonel J. B.
Anddrson.

They began by asking why Tampa had been selected, and

the Colonel gave approximately the same reasons which were
quoted above.

He then proceeded to give an account of Tampa' s

climate, health, and terrain.
• • • I have been informed that was their report, that of
all the places they visited and investigated it was their
judgement Tampa, from every standpoint, was the best they
could find. That was one reason, and another reason--I
don't know, of course, What was in the minds of the men
who came here to look over the ground--and certainly, from
our standpoint, thought Tampa--its location, its proximity
to the island of CUba, its healthfulness, its water facilities, an almost land-locked water route-waterway from Tampa
to CUba, Tampa to Key West, giving a distance of open sea
of only 90 milea--would certainly make it the best place
in the United States. I don't see any reason why it is
not considered and could not have been considered at the
time, prior to the time, and aince the troops came down,
from every standpoint, the best place for the embarkation

of the troops. Our health record--I think the facts and
figures show is the best of any southern seacoast town in
the united States. I think the health statistics taken by
the State health officials show that. We have a stated
population of 26,000 or 27,000 people, and our average
death rate is from 28 to 35 people per month, and most of
these deaths are among the ordinary classes of people and
negroes, Who are poorly clad and in a measure, poorly fed
and living in very ordinary small cabins, as you know the
poor class of people in all towns do. As I said, we have
a population of 26,000 or 27,000 people, and about 8,000
of these are CUbans. The larger percentage of deaths has
been among the CUbans, and next among the Negro people.
I have been living in Tampa seven years, and, with the
exception of a few old people, we have not had five deaths
among the better class of people in the town.
General McCOok a That is a good record.
Mr. Anderson. A great many people north think that during the summer we fairly roast down here, but as a matter
of fact, as I told some of the gentlemen in Washington a
week or two ago, we suffered more from heat the week we
were there than we did all summer here. The sun gets hot
here in the summer, but there is alway. a good breeze, and
our rainy season comes on in the summer. I don't mean by
that it rains all the time, but we have a shower almost
every day, and a good deal of thunder and lightning, and
then the sky clears up, and a breeze springs up, &nd at no
time during the seven years I have been here without a
break, with the exception of possibly ten or fifteen days,
when away on a trip, have I seen a night it was 80 hot I
could not sleep, and have never seen a day too hot for a
person unused to the sun, if he kept out of the sun. But
the laborers never suffer. Never have a sunstroke. I have
seen men out on top of buildings painting the roofs--about
as hot a place as I know of--and working on railroads, and
I have never known a man to be prostrated from heat or die
from sunstroke. We have good water, we have a good climate,
and we have a good, healthful--I don't know whether to say
soil or not, but there seems to be a lack of one or more
~f the conditions here necessary to produce what is called
malarial fever, a continued fever, or swamp fever. I have
never seen but one man, and I saw him a few days ago, Mr.
Cooper, the business manager of the Daily Times, during my
seven years in Tampa, have a spell of chills and fever such
as they have in Virginia. I have heard one doctor say and
physicians connected with the Red Cross who have been in
town quite a while say they don't think there is such a
thing as malaria. They think there is no malaria here.
In one of our interviews with General Alger, I told him
there was only one thing we demurred to, and that was

having all of the sickness that developed among the 801diers in CUba and Porto Rico and the camps throughout the
Whole country being charged to Tampa. While he, of course,
saw the point, he laughingly remarked, "Inasmuch as the
Secretary of War was held responsible for all of the sickness in the Army, and he had taken the responsibility of
selecting Tampa as the point of embarkation, he thought he
ought to assist in bearing the brunt. "2
Mr. Anderson's testimony as to reasons is further borne
out by that of General Nelson A. Miles, who stated that

H •••

if we were going to send a large force, • • • it was the best
place that could be found • • • • ,,3

His reasons refer to the

type of port fa.c ilitie8 at Port Tampa where "Nine steamers could
be loaded at the same time • • • • ,,4

His comments were ampli-

fied by further testimony describing the exact nature of the
facilities, namely, " • • • a canal possibly half a mile long
• • • ,"S which would provide the loading facilities mentioned
by naneral Miles, as well as a pier and a loading slip extending

out into Tampa Bay.
The camping facilities for troops around Tampa itself
were good, they were on relatively high ground, which afforded
drainage in case of wet weather, but it was pointed out that
the ground around Port Tampa was low, as Tolight be expected near
a natural harbor.

This ground would be unsuitable for occupa-

tion during the rainy season, but could be used when the weather
was dry.

The troops put into Tampa and the surrounding area

were housed on the high ground.
The railroads running into Tampa, and from Tampa to
Port Tampa, are of major interest, since they were the major

I
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I t_ controlled

by

the a.... man who had developed th: area around

i Port Tampa, and the Florida Central and Peninsular.
~

From Tampa

i to Port Tampa,

there was only a single line of railroad track,
, owned by the Plant Syat.e. 7
The first steps taken by the

Army

to use Tampa as a

railroad receiving point came in early May, when a number of
military personnel and civilian specialists were sent to Tampa.
Among this group was a civilian transportation clerk, George R.
Few, who later testified as to the use of the railroads at Tampa
Few arrived at Tampa May 5th, and before two weeks were out, he
was faced with a problem of colossal proportions.

Congestion

of the railroad track. was being caused by tremendous shipments
intended for the troops who were to go there, or who were
already there.

The period of congestion is mentioned by Fewl

"This congestion was about May 15 to May 30.

OUr heaviest

receipts [sic] of cars was up to, say, JUne 10 or 12, and then
we began to break the blockade • • • • "8
The Ol.ief of the Transportation Branch of the Office of
the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Charles Bird, was questioned
concerning the railroad problem, and brought to light the item
of competition between the Plant System and the Florida central
and Peninsular.
• • • there has been great complaint made • • • of stagnation there at Tampa, resulting from the congestion of cars

and the great trouble in getting things from Tampa to Port
Tampa. We understand that there were two railroads at
that time handling the cars, by what is known as the
Florida Central and Peninsular and the Plant System. Will
you explain to the commission the steps taken by the Quartermaster's Department in getting • • • from Tampa to Port
Tampa previous to starting for CUba?
Answer I The Plant System owned the line from Tampa to Port
Tampa, Florida Central, which is the road you speak of, had
their terminal in Tampa. We had very poor facilities for
transferring the food and troops that passed over their
line to the direct line leading to Port Tampa. The Plant
people wanted to cut them out and put a heavy arbitrary
on, that is, if their cars were transferred--it was a railroad dodge--they wanted to shut out our shipping stores at
allover the Florida Central and confine us to the Plant
System, and they put this heavy arbitrary on so they could
not handle cars, and in order to overcome that we insisted
upon storehouses being built at certain points, and tracks
--putting switches in, so we could handle freight and cars
over these roads. 9
Brigadier General C. F. Humphrey went into greater detail on the railroad squabble and the specific problem of transferring freight.
Question: • • • was there any friction between the Plant
System and the Plorida Central and Peninsular Railroad?
1\nswer: Yes, sir.
Question a Resulting in the congestion of the traffic of
the U.S.?
Answer a Yes, sir.
Question: If so, to what extent did it delay the transportation?
Answer a It delayed it in this way: They would greatly
delay or not accept cars from the Plorida Central and
Peninsular.
OUestion: Simply would not do it?
Answer: Yes, sir. They had a connecting track laid in
one of the streets of the city, but they failed to use it
to any considerable extent until compelled to do so. There
was a large storehouse to be built, and by some manipulation it was placed on the side of their [Plant's] track,
but I had it taken down and put up between the two roads
where they nearly come together. The two roads run within
a ahort diatance of each other at one point near the city
and then branch off to their stations, about three-quarters
of a mile apart. The Plant System was required to construct or permit of the construction of a connecting track

at or near the first-named point. 10
The situation at Tampa may be likened to a giant funnel,
with someone periodically cutting off half of the flow into the
wide part.

The Plant System with its single track was the nar-

row part of the funnel, and by delaying or refusing to handle
cars from the Florida Central and Peninsular it impeded the outflow of supplies at Port Tampa.

By

JUne 4, the situation had

become so confused that the Quartermaster-General had to direct
his officers to use both the Plant and F. C. & P. lines equally.
This was apparently in response to the demands of the Plant System for the lion's share of the traffic. ll
As

a result of the delays in movement over the single

track to Port Tampa, cars began to pile up on sidings north of
Tampa.

The only thing to do was to unload things at Tampa, and

get the most important items to the depot. and thence to the
troops.

But a new problem arose, that of finding the cars with

the most important items, or in fact, of finding any items.

Mr.

Ff!M explains this problem in his testimony.
Question: Can you explain to m~ why there was such a congestion of railway trains here in supplying the command
which left for CUba? What was the occasion for that?
Answer I I do not know exactly what the occasion was.
They were supplying us from all directions--St. Louis,
New York, Chicago, and, in fact, all points where troops
came from.
Question: Were the contents of these cars sent to you
properly billed?
Answer: Yes, sir, but they lacked car numbers, that is,
the numbers of the cars were not specified on the bills of
lading.
Question: And therefore you could not tell what was in
these cars?
Answer: No, sir.

Question: And who is responsible for that?
Answer: I think the quartermasters and majors were.
Question: At points of shipment.
Answer: Yes, sir. We called the attention of the
Quartermaster-General to that, and afterwards we notified
the Quartermaster-General of the condition of affairs here
of the car numbers on the bills of lading. He notified
the shipping officers, and they inserted the car numbers
on the bills of lading, and that enabled us to check the
freight as it came in.
Question: Now you say that was on account of the cars not
being numbered?
Answer: In one sense of the word it was. Of course, the
cars came in here and we could not locate the stores we
needed the most.
Question: To what extent did the congestion exist?
Answer: It was in such shape that we could not get at the
freight as we wanted it on account of track room here. • • •
Question: Were these tracks filled up for miles?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: How many?
Answer: I do not know exactly. I suppose all the side
tracks were filled up. I know in one instance we had
stores, and they said th~ went 17 miles from here to
Turkey Creek side track. 12
The omission of car numbers from bills of lading was
merely a continuation of the practice followed in peacetime.
Few said, "They billed according to the way they did previous
to the war. Mll

He does not mention a problem which arose before

that of the lack of numbers on bills of lading, namely, that of
the delays in receipt of bills of lading_

The Quartermaster-

General contracted all depot quartermasters by telegraph June 2,
1898, and directed them to forward all bills of lading to the
quartermaster at the destination without delay.l4

One depot

quartermaster responded to the telegram, indicating that his
delays in forwarding bills of lading were due to the rush of
business.

He had, in order to save time, told the civilian

suppliers to send the Army shipments directly to the railroads

and then give his office the bills of lading.

He explained to

the Quartermaster-General that this process, while speeding
shipment, caused delays of up to eight days in forwarding bills
of lading to the destination. lS
only four days after directing the immediate forwarding
of bills of lading, the Quartermaster-General again contacted
the depot quartermasters, this time about the placing of car
numbers on bills of lading.
In order to avoid confusion at destination which now exist~
you are hereby directed in making shipments of stores to
Tampa, Chattanooga, and other points, to forward in advance to the receiving officers complete invoices and bills
of lading. The contents of boxes and packages will be
plainly marked thereon. The numbers and descriptions of
the cars with copies of waybills will also be forwardedlgs
soon as they can be obtained from the railroad company.
However, the orders came too late to help out the situation at Tampa when the Shafter expedition was embarking on
June 7.

Mr. Pew was questioned on the effects of the rail tie-

up on the troops at Tampa.
Question. Do you know whether there was any great inconvenience experienced by the troops on account of lack of
delivery of these supplies?
Answer: Yes, sir. There was great inconvenience.
Question: Was the.expedition delayed on account of that,
do you think?
Answer. No, sir, I do not think it waa. I think they had
everything they wanted at the time they sailed, because we
rushed everything down there. We worked night and day.l7
After locating the necessary supplies, unloading them
was the next order of business.

Few told the Dodge Commission

that attempts were made to unload the cars on the side tracks
to get goods.

The officer in charge of this phase of the

operation was Lieutenant J. S. Roudiez, a Regular Army officer.
He began work on unloading on May 16 or 18, according to Fav. 18

The commission was not entirely sure that everything had been
done, and Few was asked if the job could have been done better
by civilian experts, who would be better equipped to manage

large quantities of freight over a single track.
Question: Is it not a fact that where well managed an
immense amount of buainess can be transacted on a single
track and one switch?
Answer: Yea, sir.
Question: Do you think you would have been able to handle
them if properly billed and marked?
Answer: Yes, sir • • • .19
Question I Do you suppose if you had here an assiatant
superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad, or one of the
through lines down here in charge of transportation,
couldn't he have jerked a good deal of the transportation
aaide?
Answer: I do not think that he could have bettered the
things, OWing to the lack of a side track.
Question. It was owing to the lack of terminal facilities
and proper billa of lading?
Answer. Yes, sir. We made a demand for certain i tams and
could not find them on account of not having proper car
numbers. If we had the numbers, we could have gotten the
stores we wanted. 20
The problem of car marking had not yet been solved by
JUly 12, when the Quartermaster-General

tel~raphed

all shipping

officers as follows.
Hereafter pleas. securely fasten to door of each car of
freight shipped to Tampa or Port Tampa a red card 12 inches
square, conspicuously marked to show character of contents
and destination. Por example, "Ordnance stores--Tampa,"
"Commissary Supplies--Port Tampa." Where an agent is sent
in charge of important shipments he should carry duplicate
bills of lading with him and be directed to report immediately to the quartermaster upon arrival at destination.
Where agents are not sent, duplicate bills should be mailed
80 as to arrive as aoon as the stores.
Acknowledge re,ceipt.2~

This problem was compounded by the limited facilities
and the lack of transportation facilities such as loading docks,
and the shortage of transportation equipment.
• • • in the first place, we did not have the necessary
transportation at the start. When I came here we only had
about a dozen private teams, and then Colonel Humphrey-after a time our regular army tranaporation began to arrive
and we then had equipment--the wagons and mules came. The
mules would come one day and then harness another time.
We had to pick these out as they arrived, and then we got
out transportation in such shape as to handle the goods.
starting from the first--that was along about the 15th of
May that this congestion commenced--that is, we handled the
material from the 1st of May until about the 12th of Mayas
it came in, and then along about the 15th we received a
large number of tents, and, of course, they had no trackage
here and no terminal facilities. For instance, the
F. c. & P. only have one line of track, and they would not
let the cars stay on the track long enough to unload th~~
They had to move them to let the regular trains come in.
It will be noted that one area of equipment which was
lacking, and which was apparently a cause for some delay was
that of mules, equipment such as harnesses, and wagons.

The

chief of the Bureau of Transportation in the office of the
Quartermaster-General was asked about this problem by the Dodge
Commission.
Questionz HoW long were you in securing the number of
wagons as required for the equipment of the Army as it
was organized and put in the field?
Answer: We started in at first furnishing what the regiments would actually require in camp. We furnished enough
for the depot quartermaster and then four for each regiment. It took until well on into Ju13. We supplied the
troops ordered to CUba first • • • .2
As pointed out above, the Regular
wagons, teams, and harnesses with them.

Army

brought their own

Perhaps this was just

as well because they represented the total amount of wagons and

equipment in the Army as of the date of mobilization.
• • • all the wagons we had at the beginning of the war
were in the hands of troops at the posts.
Question: What is the regulation allowance for a regiment?
Answer4- . . . the wagon transportation, 21 to the divi8ion. 2
This allowance of wagons would work out to two wagons
for each regiment of the nine in a division of three brigades.
Later, this allowance was vastly increased. in an order from
General Miles, to twenty-five wagons per regiment.

The head-

quarters, which had absorbed the three extra wagons in the nineregiment division also received an addition of wagon allowance.
Brigade headquarters now received two wagons, and division headquarters four wagons, under the new plan published May 25 by
General Miles. 2S

The Quartermaater-General waa taking action to

see that wagons, mules, and harnesses were delivered without
delay.

On May 20, he contacted all depot quartermasters by

telegraph and directed them to speed up shipment of these items.
Frequent complaints are now reaching this office as to
unlocked for delays in delivery of mules, wagons, harneaaea, etc., shipped from st. Louia and Jeffersonville to
Chick~au9a and Tampa.
You will take this matter up with
the proper officials of the roads you are using for such
transportation, and see that any congestion resulting in
delays is promptly relieved. Prompt delivery i. now easential to military operations, and must be obtained. If it
will aid matters in large shipments by you to these points,
you will send competent and duly authorized man along to
see that the freight goes through without delay. Give
this matter immediate attention and report your actions
by wire. 26
TWo points mentioned in this telegram betray the urgency
of affairs at this point.

The first is the use of the sentence,

"Prompt delivery is nOW essential to military operations, and

must be obtained."

This reflects what has been noticed earlier

in discussions of transportation, the rush element.
point is a peculiarly military one.

The second

It refers to the closing

sentence of the wire, which directs immediate attention and a
report of actions taken by wire.

Immediate attention i. often

requested in the polite military style of the day, but in the
military, when an officer of general rank asks for a return
report on actions taken to correct a situation, it is an indication that fast action is required.

At no other point in the

available correspondence does the Quartermaster-General use such
expressions, and it may be concluded that he wanted something
done in a hurry.

The telegram is duplicated in a message to

COlonel Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster at Tampa, and he is told,
"You will see that no congestion occurs preventing delivery of
such freight at the Tampa end of the line ~127

Humphrey was to

use his own judgement aa to how this was to be accomplished.
The use of wagons to unload the strings of cars was not
without its problems, either.

Not all locations were usable as

unloading points.
Questiona What was the occasion of the congestion, the
lack of men to unload the cars?
Answer a No, I don't think it was the fault of the railroads, which were doing all they could. It was simply
beyond their capacity, they had facilities for handling a
certain amount of business, and this was way beyond that.
Question a If they got the cars there, that was all they
had to do, wasn't it?
Answer a They could not get them there, that is, where they
could be unloaded.
Question: That is, the platform or station facilities were
not equal to the demand of the business?
Answer a They could not get the cars in there. Th ey lacked

facilities in that reapect. They didn't have warehouses,
and the government didn't have places to unload when you
got to them.
Question: Had you land transportation--wagons, mul ~s, and
transportation of that kind--that would have enabled you to
unload the cars into wagons and get at the contents of the
cars?
Answer: You could not get at cars anywhere on the railroad
with wagons, you could not get up to them. If you had had
thousands of teams, you could not have got them. You have
to get at them at certain places. You could not get at th
on a grade.
Question a Of course not, or over a cut, but you don't have
much of that sort of railroad in Florida?
Answers You don't have very high embankments, but still
there are obstacles to prevent unloading into wagons. We
went several miles out of town, where a wagon road crossed
the railroad, and we unloaded there.
Question: Did you have enough men to make crossings
wherever you pleased--that is, to bring the railroad track
and the army wagon even?
Answer a We had men enough, but whether they did the unload
ing properly is for aomebody else to say. If the men had
been turned loose
laborers, they probably could have
done it. 28

.a

The whole problem concerning the railroads, loading and
unloading, and atorage continued throughout the embarkation of
the Fifth Corps.

The movement of troops and equipment to the

docks at Port Tampa was complicated by the single track of the
Plant System connecting Tampa and Port Tampa.

Not only the

troops and material of the Fifth Corps, but also train loads of
sighteers jammed the tracks, increasing the confusion.

The

enterprising Mr. Plant, who was profiting from rail freight into
Tampa, the single line to Port 'lamp., the Tampa Bay Hotel, and
ship chartering, waa leaving no stone unturned in his search for
profits.

The Chief Quartermaster of the Fifth Corps, Colonel

Humphrey, commented on the situation during the embarkation.

• • • the lack of sufficient facilities of the railroad
yards and the limited facilities for loading afforded by
the pier at Port Tampa, and the additional inconvenience
and hindrance caused by trains running between Tampa and
the head of the pier and the throngs of people they
brought. Regularly cars had to be run back to the yards-one and a half or two miles distant--to be replaced by
other cars, and a little later these were run back to the
yard only partially unloaded and replaced by those first
brought there, to again be returned to same point. 29
The embarkation had ample room for confusion from the
standpoint of railroad freight operations alone, and even the
movement of over 16, 000 men out of Port Tampa, accompanied by
all of their equipment did not relieve the congestion on the
railroads.

Part of this problem was due to the fact that there

had been several changes in plan by the War Department.

When

Tampa was selected as the port of embarkation, only a small
expedition, of perhaps 5,000 men, was planned. 30

Later this

was expanded, as has been described above, to a force of 70,000
planned to move from Tampa. 31

Although the plan for 70,000 men

was changed, no one cancelled the requisition. and movement
orders for the supplie., and so they came to Tampa.

The day

after the Fifth COrps sailed, the Depot OUartermaster at Tampa
sent a report to the OUartermaster-General describing what he
still had to handle in the way of rail shipments.
Referring to your telegram of the 14th instant regarding
state of freight at this point, there are 100 cars of the
Florida Central and Peninsular and 111 of the Plant System
at this point, and SO cars at Port Tampa remaining to be
unloaded. There are several hundred cars on sidings north
of this point. cars are now being unloaded at the rate of
about 70 per day. The new storage house is approaching
completion, and portion now under cover is being used for
storage. If matters proceed a. they are now proceediR9,
the track will be completely cleared in a week, including

everything to the north of this place. Have paid no demurrage accounts, and recommend that none be paid. The congestion at this point was due as much to the railroad as
tc the government, and the unloading has often been impeded
by the railroads not placing the cars when requested to do
so. Some time ago I took up the subjects of rates and
freight charges, but have not had time to make a report.
They charge 2 cents a mile for passengers, and were not
inclined to make a reduction, though my remarks upon their
freight and passenger charges were very caustic. They
claim that there is some arrangement made with the traffic
and passenger associations which require them to make
charges. 32
This is the day after the pressure was taken off, and
the railroads were still congested to the tune of 261 cars in
and around the

~ampa

area, plus "several hundred" on sidings.

'lbe entire operation unloading at the rate of seventy cars a
day was a week behind, and the storage house was not completed.
Despite heroic efforts, the obstacles to a 8IllOOth flow of aupplies had proved to be insurmountable in the amount of time
available.

For the record, during the use of

~ampa

as a port

and railhead from May 18 to August 31, 13,329 freight cars were
either loaded or unloaded, 9.919 hors•• and mules were issued,
and 604 wagons were assembled.

In

addition, 699 wagon. and

ambulances were repaired, twenty-one pack trains were fitted
out, and a total of 661 teams were broken in. 33

~ansportation

during the pre-embarkation and embarkation phase suffered from
delays in trackage, storage, and hauling equipment at the start,
and although improvements were made in all areas, there was not
enough time for the improvements to take effect on the operations of the Fifth Corps.

Thus, when Shafter's troops sailed

they experienced difficulty in moving to the dock and loading_

The next area to be examined is that of supply.

The

Ouartermaster's Department had a great area of responsibility
in supply, and many of the men who were critical of the Department • s operationa were not aware of the problems it faced.

For

example, one of the moat widely quoted statements concerning the
logiatics of Tampa is this one of Teddy Roosevelt' a.
The delays and stupidity of Flagler and the Ordnance
Department aurpas. belief. The OUartermaster Department
is better, but bad. The Commissary Department is good.
There i. no head, no management whatever in the war 3R-Partmenta Against a good nation we should be helpless.
Haw correct are these statements?
shortages, and errors?

Were there delays,

The only way to answer charges like these

is to take a sampling of the testimony of men directly involved
with the Departments concerned, such as commissary officers,
commissary and quartermaster sergeants, mess stewards and ordnance officers.
A good place to start in evaluating the correctness of
Roosevelt's statement is his awn outfit, the Rough Riders.

Major

H. B. Hersey testified before the Dodge Commiasion on the subject
of suppliea at Tampa.
OUestion: Were you abundantly supplied with everything?
Answer: We were a little short on blankets and some supplies of that nature when we first arrived. They were
ordered, but were a little slow in arriving.
Question & Was any special inconvenience suffered on that
account?
Answer: No, sir. 35
In view of what has been said up to this time concerning
tranaport at Tampa, a delay of some length in receiving items
should not seem unusual.

The lack of supplies was not of such a

nature as to create an inconvenience, Major Hersey was then
asked if he knew of any negligence or anything wrong in any
department.
Question, If there was anything occurred at Tampa through
negligence, or if anything went wrong in any department
under your command, please state it.
Answer. I don't know of a thinge I found the supply
departments all right, and that is one of the very important features. It was in charge of Major Bellinger,
quartermaster department. I had regulars encamped on each
side of me. The Second Cavalry on one side and the Pifth
on the other, and my relations with the officers of these
regiments were very pleasant, and they assisted me all they
could. Qle offered to send me over a quartermaster and
give my quartermaster instructions as to minute details,
and in every way I received assistance from regular officers which enabled me6to take better care of my men than
if I had been alone. 3
Testimony of this type tends to prove that far from being
stupid and incompetent, the supply departments were efficient and
helpful.

However, one case cannot be accepted as proof of over-

all efficiency, as perhaps a look at things from the viewpoint
of the enlisted man is in order.

Quartermaster Sergeant

w. w.

Hill testified that although training in supply duties was necessary, "We had no time to drill them on quartermaster's or commissary's work.· 37

This highlights the problem which is common

among accounts of the Volunteer regiments, namely, inexperience.
Men were suddenly required to perform duties involving the health
and comfort of their fellows without being trained for these

duties.

The only check on these men was provided by the incor-

rect performance of their duties, which resulted in discomfort
or disease for their comrades.
The problems of the Quartermaster's Department at Tampa

are tied directly to the railroad problem.

General Nelson Miles,

who waa on the scene, reported these problems vividly in a series
of

t.1eqra~s

to the Secretary of War I

To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present conditions, 15 cars loaded with uniforms were side-tracked 25
miles away from Tampa., and remained there for weeks while
the troops were suffering for clothing. 38
Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uniformsl • j • and some without blankets, tents, or camp
equipage. 9
Both of these telegrams were sent on JUne 4, with the
_xpedi tion for Cuba in its final stages of preparation.

The

ahortages were due to the railroad tie-up, not to the failure of
the Quartermaster's Department to send enough supplies.

A regu-

lar army brigade commissary, who was also acting quartermaster,
testified that he was able to draw transport, aome tentage, and
aome clothing without delay, and that he was, in general, well
supplied.

His only areas of complaint were in relation to delays

in wagons and harness, and the unava i lability of certain items
and sizes of clOthing. 40

A point of interest which runs through

all of the testimony relating to the Quartermaster's Department
is that, on the average, the Department is not accused of failing to supply the items wanted, but ia inatead charged with failure to deliver them faat enough.

Many of the units who were not

destined for the CUba expedition felt the supply pinch, since
priority was given to outfitting the Fifth Corps.

The COmmand-

ing Officer of the 1st Ohio Volunteers makes mention of the fact
that quartermaster supplies were short, and hie supply officer.

were told that issues to the Fifth Corps took priority over those
to other units. 4l
The Ordnance Department suffered from the transportation
snarl, too.

The Chief of Ordnance related generally what had

happened.
Now when I got complaints that troops did not receive their
arms or had not received their equipment, it was uniformly
[sic] the case that I had not received any requisition for
them. At firat, these requisitions did not come to the
ordnance officer, but they were sent to the arsenal direct,
at the same time, I understood that the transportation
became swamped, that stores were there in cars and could
not be found, and then were not delivered to the officers,
and then again, I found, as I stated before, that arms that
did arrive were taken and turned over to others and the
Ordnance Department never informed of the fact, or of the
fact that troops had already received their arms and had
them taken away. 42
The swamped transportation delayed all types of ordnance
stores, including both small arms and artillery.
General Miles noted on June 4

If • • •

For example,

five thousand rifles which

were discovered yesterday were needed by several regiments.
Also the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for
the same, which will be required immediately on landing, are
scattered through hundreds of cars on the side tracks of the
railroads ...43

Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Miley also noted the

problems of ordnance stores for the artillery.
The siege artillery and the ammunition had come in from
different arsenals and at different times, and much delay
arose in gathering all of the parts and mounting the guns
on the carriages • • • it was deemed necessary to mount
the guns before placing them on the transports, and the 44
artillery troops worked night and day to hasten the work.
Because of this railroad problem, regiments were without
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weapons, and as a result, could not carry out training.
noted that

M.

0

•

Miles

several [regiments] came without arms • • • The

32nd Michigan, which is one of the best, came without arms.
General Guy V. Henry reports that five regiments of his command
are not fit to go into the field."45

And again, a little later,

Miles states that "Between 30 and 40 percent are undrilled in
the manual of arms with weapons, and in one regiment over 300
men have never fired a gun.- 46
However, not all of the problem was due to the railroad
snarl.

The Ordnance Department was still a month behind in their

production of troops' equipment, and was unable to obtain suitable substitutes in the commercial market.

For example, the

standard woven cartridge belt was only made by one company, which
held the patent on its design.

other firms would have to tool up

to produce this item, and so substitutes were sought.

What

appeared to be a suitable item was procured and sent to Tampa,
but the troops refused it, aince it was not of standard design.
The item later proved to be unserviceable, and few were issued.
The ties of logistics to the combat arms in action are
often unrealized or at least unnoticed.

Yet a logistical problem

which was not solved became a matter of life or death to the men
of the Seventy-First New York, one of the two volunteer infantry
regiments sent to CUba with the Fifth Corps.

The regiment went

to CUba with the old .45 caliber Springfield rifles, for which
only black-powder cartridges were available.

The first time they

went into action, their first shots disclosed their position to

the enemy, and they were pinned down and suffered many casualties.

The inability of the Ordnance Department to get smokeless

powder cartridges produced, or to get Krag-Jorgensen .30 caliber
rifles issued cost men their lives.

The Krags were available,

because the Rough Riders got them, but then the Seventy-First
did not have a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy as its
regimental executive officer.
The COMmissary-General of Subsistence had been busy,
shipping supplies into Tampa, and contracting with local suppliers for various items.

Between May 20 and June 16, six .

contracts were let to contractors for fresh meat for the camps.
The contractors were required to post a bond, covering their
activities during the period of the contract, July 1 to December 31.

The contracts were for fresh beef, and in one case,

fresh mutton.

The government paid between 10 and 12.5 cents a

pound for the earlier supplies, but as competition became more
intense, the price went down to 7.2 cents, then 7.1, and finally
6.9 cents a pound. 47
Unlike the property of the other technical service
departments, that of the Subsistence Department deteriorated
when kept too long in storage.

The Commissary-General reacted

quickly to the news of a freight tie-up.
I underAtood there was difficulty in 7ampa with regard to
the loading, and when I learned it I t~legraphed to the
Commissary to ascertain what was to be done, and I told
them to Pilfer charges against the quartermaster if he was
to blame.
The orders for my department were to throw ninety days 8

supplies for 70,000 men into Tampa. These orders • • • were
given a few days before my appointment as CommissaryGeneral. We threw the bacon in there. The congestion
occurred. I was appalled. We had no storehouse for the
Subsistence Department. I sent telegrams to the depot
commissary, Colonel Smith, to hire laborers, and unload
those cars at any cost. • .General Shafter went 11ay with
16,000 men. They carried four months' supplies.
~ne

Commissary-General soon became convinced that, if he

were to do his job efficiently, he should control the shipment
of sUbsistence supplies as well as their procurement.

He de-

scribes in his testimony before the Dodge Commission, how he had
to explain to a foreign military attache that subsistence supplies changed hands from four to six times during shipment,
dependent upon how far they were to be sent.

At another point,

he describes his request for two ships to send SUbsistence
supplies, and the refusal of the Quartermaster-Goneral to allow
the use of these two ships for that purpose. SO
Once the supplies reached the depot commissary at Tampa,
they seem to have been handled in a fairly organized and
efficient manner.

There were, as one officer described it, u. _

• a few little irritating delays, from the inexperience of new
staff officers • • • in the quartermaster's and commissary'.
both. uSl

There did seem to be a problem of sorts with regard

to food spoilage.

One of the assistant commissaries commented

that, " • • • a good many of our supplies have been on hand as
long as four or five months, and are not as fresh as they might
be.- S2

He added that there was - • • • only one complaint at

Tampa, mnd that was of the bacon.- S3

One of the men who was

drawing supplies from the commissary said there was " • • • some
little trouble at Tampa about potatoes and onions, but that coulo
not be helped, it was the hot weather, and they were shipped on
too long transit to be good when they camee n54

The railroad tie-

up again involves another department in difficulty because of
freight delays.
The business of drawing from the SUbsistence Department
for feeding the troops was fairly complex.

The number of days

for which rations were to be drawn was at the discretion of the
commanding officer.
They are supposed to draw seven days of fresh and three of
salt rationsl that, however, is not obligatory on the company_ The commanding officer can have eight or ten days
rations issued. The number of days is discretionary with
the commanding officer. The usage, in thesgiscretion of
the Commanding General, is seven to three.
The Commanding General set the relation of fresh to salt
rations, and the Army ration list set the composition of the
rations.

Speaking of food complaints, one company commissary

sergeant said that the men were used to better fare, and disliked
the Army food, but that he could do nothing about it since the
company sergeant had nothing to say on the composition of the
rations.

His efforts to get variety in the rations given to his

men by substituting additional rice for the beans were unsuccessful.

His regimental commissary officer told him it could

not be done. S6
Vast quantities of food were flowing into Tampa, and the
Quarte~aster-General

ing supplies.

asked the Commissary-General to stop send-

The issuing and care of the rations was an area in which
problems seemed to arise constantly.

One depot commissary

officer remarked that the brigade and regimental commissaries
tried to take care of the food, but that there seemed to be a
lack of discipline, and his instructions on care of the rations
were either forgot.ten or ignored.

He said that there was no

evidence of training on the part of the commanders of lower units
to insure that the commissary people knew their jobs. 57

One

company commissary sergeant described his duties as drawing
rations for ten days, taking care of them, and overseeing cooking.

This particular non-commissioned officer consulted with

his company commander on the meals to be served to the men,
which was unusual at the time. 58

The fresh beef appeared to

have often been an unsatisfactory item since several of the
commissary people mention it in their testimony.

A regimental

commissary said there were no problems in the commissary area
except for the beef, which his unit returned to the brigade
commissary, and got hams for use instead.

He said that the

regular ration was enough if the company commissary sergeant
took care of it.

In some cases, though, all the care possible

was not sufficient.
We found cases • • • where it was alleged that the beef had
been i.ssued in the morning and b 0re it could be cooked
for dinner it was found tainted.

S9

The act.i on which should have been taken in this case is
that which was described above, namely that of returning the beef
to the commissary and exchanging it for other suitable food.

The Commissary-General said that such occurrences were due to
long storage during shipment, exposure to the sun during transfer from one point to another, and poor care of the meat during
the transfer.

He stated that if a latent taint existed in the

meat as issued, the unit was not to blame.

He cited a number of

cases where bad meat had been returned to the contractor, and
good meat required to be substituted. 60
The Subsistence Department kept close supervision over
the supply of food by contractors.

The issue of potatoes and

onions was a good example of this supervision.

To save

t~e

and

handling, issues were made from the railroad cars at the warehouae to unit commissaries.

Upon presentation of an order from

the Subsistence Department, the commissaries could draw potatoes
and onions from the railroad cars.

An

officer of the SUbsis-

tence Department supervised the whole transaction, weighing
each sack, and tabulating the difference over or short of the
amount contracted for.

After the issue was completed, any

amount short was required to be added to the issue on the spot.6~
Any items found to be unusable could be exchanged at once.
The attitude of the voluntesrs toward Army food is perhaps best expressed by one private, who said, "They have never
been away from home, and they think they are going to have
coffee like their mother made. "62
surprisingly, felt that the

Army

The Commissary-General, not

was, as a whole, well fed.

In

preparing for the operation of Tampa, he had sent a depot commis8ary there over and above the allowance authorized by

regulations.

In addition, General Shafter had a commissary

officer on his staff to handle problems in this area.

The

quantity of food was adequate, and the quality about average,
but the poor preparation created waste.

The fact that the

Quartermaster's Department had oharge of shipping is probably
responsible for the lack of cooking devices on board ship.

The

men were issued travel rations, but, "In the haste under which
the santiago expedition left Tampa, proper provisions for cooking the food of the men in the transports seems to have been
either neglected or impossible.H 63

The American soldier was not

to be deprived of his food, however, and he managed to rig up
numerous odd devices to heat the rations.

One volunteer regi-

ment • a cooks ". • • dumped the required number of cans of corned
beef into a wash boiler, broke some hardtack into it, and then,
on deck, turned a steampipe from the engine room into it ... 64
One of the logistical weaknesses of the commissary
operations at Tampa wa* the lack of regimental commissary officers and sergeants.

In the companies, the work of the commissary

was done as an additional duty of the quartermaster sergeant.
This meant that there were no full time commissaries below the
brigade level.

With the best intentions in the world, men

assigned to two duties could not do justice to both, and the
additional duty of commissary work was usually the one that
suffered.
The Medical Department like all of the other technical
service departments, suffered because of the railroad operations

at Tampa.

The Surgeon-General said,

There were temporary delays in the arrival of supplies at
• • • Tampa, Florida, for General Shafter's Army, but they
were in all cases due to defective transportation facilities, and not to the want of foresight or prompt at~!ntion
to requisitions on the part of the Surgeon-General.
The facilities for medieal care were begun at Tampa
around May 4, when Major A. H. Appel, a surgeon, was directed
by the Medical Department to establish a hospital for the troops

of the Fifth Corps.

Major Appel had several sources of supply

in setting up his operation.

First, there were the supply

facilities of the Medical and Quartermaster's Departments.
These facilities supplied tentage, hospital bedding, litters,
horses, mules, wagons, and medicine.

In addition, an order from

the SUrgeon-General's office had broken up the regimental hospitals, and all of their supplies were transferred to Major Appel's
hospital.

This order was not well liked in the volunteer ArmY,

because many of the regiments had elaborate hospitals and felt
that they could care for their men better than another medical
facility.

Finally, the Major was given authority to purchase

medicine and supplies from local suppliers.

He made use of all

of these sources of supplies, drawing plenty of tentage from the
Quartermaster's Department, as well as six ambulances and six
escort wagons, and forty-eight mules.

His operation was well

stocked with medicine, both from the regimental hospitals and
the local supplier•• 66

He also had available the medical supply

depot, which the Department had established at Tampa to handle
the issue of medical supplies to the Army.

The supply depot was not always able to supply the
demands made upon it by medical officers, particularly those of
volunteer regiments.

The problem lay in the fact that the only

medicines which the depot could stock for issue were those which
the Army had gotten around to approving.

Naturally, the volun-

teer surgeons, many of whom had been appointed directly from
civilian life, wanted to use the latest medicines, and the depot
often did not have these, and could not get them for the surgeons.
The surgeons were not always well informed as to the
mechanics of requisitioning, either.

The Surgeon-General point-

ed out that
• • • difficulty has arisen, no doubt, from the ignorance
of volunteer medical officers of the proper mode of making
requisition for medical supplies, and because they did not
always take the trouble to inform themselves or to consult
the manuals and regulations, which were freely distributed~7
The purchasing of the additional supplies on the local
market did not constitute any great difficulty.

Major Appel

said that there were several drug stores in Tampa, which were
able to supply all of his needs.

Captain C. C. McCUlloch, the

officer conunanding the hospital in West Tampa, said "The medical
depot would not have supplies we needed on hand, but we would
buy them. It 68

Food for the patients in hospitals does not seem to have
been much of a problem.

Captain MCCUlloch was interviewed in

August, just after the troops had been ordered north and he said
that he had remaining from SUbsistence funds Meleven hundred

dollars that I • • • turned back to the Commissary Department. M69

B¥ the time the embarkation for CUba began, the Medical
Department facilities at Tampa were in condition for active
service.

There were shortages in ambulances, wagons, horses,

and harnesses, and the ambulance corps was not up to its authorized strength in men, but medical supplies and equipment for
treatment of wounded were adequate. 70
Closely related to the medical aspects of the use of
Tampa is the consideration of troop housing.

Colonel Anderson,

the native of Tampa who testified before the Dodge Commission on
the climate and living conditions of the area, had stated that
the first troops put into the area were placed on high ground,
but that the units which arrived later were put into low ground,
Which was suitable for use until the rainy season began.

The

official report of the Dodge Commission said,
Most of the men were encamped in healthful locations, but
some of them on ground so low that when the rainy season
commenced much discomfort was experienced. The water
supply was ample and good, being obtained from the works
of the Plant System, which was (sic) extended into the
camps of the various organizations. • • The excessive
heat of the summer caused considerable discomfort to the
troops and live stock, and the order for transfer to
71
Montauk Point the first part of August was very welcome.
During the period that Tampa was used as a point of concentration and a port of embarkation, it was occupied by 48,072
troops of both the volunteer and Reqular Army.

Virtually the

entire Regular Army was at Tampa, according to the official
figures of 27,602 Regulars.

In

addition, some 20,470 Volunteers

were at Tampa during the period of its use.

It is important

to note t.hat all of the troops enumerated above' were not at
'tampa at the same time.

On June 20, six days after Shafter's

force sailed, there were 19,322 men at Tampa, and by July 20,
this figure had increased to 25,306. 72
The period of occupation by the troops of the Fifth
Corps began with the arrival of the Regular Army units in the
early part of May, and terminated with its departure on June 14.
The Regulars were accustomed to setting up camp, and soon had
made themselves comfortable.

The volunteer units sent to join

them were supposed to be the best of those available at ChickaInauga, and they also seem to have gotten along fairly well.
The period of difficulty began with the departure of the
Fifth Corps, and the arrival of many more volunteers.

The units

which moved in set up camp in the low ground vacated by some of
the units of the Fifth Corps .. and built themselves shacks with
boards "scrounged" from the local area.
really, until the rains came.

This was not a bad idea ..

Then the shacks became a breed-

ing place for infection, due to the low ground, which collected
water into stagnant pools, and the general ignorance of sanitary practices prevailing among the volunteers.

Worse yet, when

a move to higher ground was suggested, the units did not want to
leave their shacks for tents, and refused to move.

This created

a large amount of disease, which kept the medical facilities
full.
~le

best commentary on the reasons for the problems

described comes from the Dodge Commission, which investigated

the camp at Tampa,as well as all of the other camps used during
the war.
• • • it may be said that it is impossible to bring together
a regiment of 1,300 men who'se lives and habits have all
been different and place them in camp, subject them to its
discipline, diet, and duties, without much complaint. They
must bpcome acclimated and accustomed to camp life before
sickness can be prevented • • • • The imprudent acts of the
soldie,! are the first and greatest cause of sickness in
camps.
Fortunately for the health of the men, the occupation of
the camps did not last long enough for any problems of epidemic
proportions to develop.

At CUlp Thomas, the volunteer units

were ravaged by disea.e caused by conditions such as have been
described at Tampa, allowed to continue for three or four months.
The embarkation phase of the operation can be properly
said to have begun with the embarkation of the Fifth COrps, and
terminated with the laat use of Tampa as a logistical base.
This use of Tampa continued into the fall of 1898, but the major
part of the logistical operations was carried out during the
summer months.

In add!'tion to the shipment of the elements of

the Fifth Corps, the base at Tampa .ent out ships with logistical supplies for the force in Cuba, and received and cared for
the sick who were sent back.

By the time the base was abandoned,

the operations were being carried out smoothly, with no back-up
of equipment or delay in supply issue.
The embarkation and movement of the Fifth Corps to CUba
was ordered by telegraph on May 31.

The order specified the

units to be taken in the most general terms, telling Qeneral

Shafter only to "take your command aboard transports"74 and move
to CUba.

This order had been preceded by a series of messages

from the Commanding General of the Army, which were not too
specific.
On

May 26, Shafter was told to be "prepared to take

25,000 men" for the expedition.

Three days later, this figure

had evaporated, and he was told to take "your most effective
force of regulars and volunteers."

The next day, this was made

a little more specific by directing the movement of "an effective
force of infantry and artillery, both regular and volunteer".75
The final composition of the expedition is described by
a piece of official correspondence which gives the total
strength figures.
telegraphic orders of May 31, General Shafter was
directed to proceed with his command on transports to the
vicinity of Santiago de CUba, and, on June 8, preparatory
to departure, the transports were loaded with the following
troops. First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, 'l'enth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth,
Seventeenth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second, and
Twenty-fourth regiments of infantry, two dismounted squadrons of four troops each from the First, Third, Sixth,
Ninth and Tenth o. s. cavalry and First U. s. Volunteer
cavalry, one squadron Second cavalry, light batteries E
and K, Firat Artillery, A and F, Second Artillery, Heavy
batteries G and H, Fourth Artillery, Companies C and E,
Engineers, Seventy-Firat New York and Second Massachusetts,
making a grand6total of • • • 815 officers and 16,072
enlisted men. 7
By

In preparation for the embarkation, the Quartermaate4-

General asked for a report on the status of shipping, and the
carrying capacity of the vessels on hand.

Colonel Humphrey

telegraphed the following reply on May 20th, no doubt after

conferring with Captain McRay, his civilian shipping conSUltant.
Your telegram of the 19th, regarding carrying capacity of
transports chartered, so far as known to this office, at
Port Tampa are San Marcos, Comal. Alamo, Gussie, Whitney,
Florida, Olivette. Allbih'ji' Berkshire, D. H. Miller, at
New Orleans, the Oriza~. _eakwater, Stillwater. Arkansa.,
and Morgan' at Mobile, Mlt'tteawan and Fanital not yet received here, Concho, Rio Glande. Leona. Vigilancia.
Sequranca. YUcatan' Senec" Saratoga, Santiago. City of
washIngton. Manteo. Cherokee, Iroquois and Miami. Captain
McKay, who knows all these vessels, states they will carry
24,900 men, 1,406 horses and 90 mules. All ships at Port
Tampa are fitted out with stalls and bunks, so far as
practicable. The Qrizaba was fi tted out with same before
she was sent to New Orleans. The other ships will be put
in order for men and animals as fa8t a8 they arrive. Have
material ready. Presume your intention is to fit up all
vessels not yet arrived to carry as many animals as practi-

~:~~e~es~lY~~rW::im~k:sf~~d::~P~~ri~h~:: ~C~e!:~;7in
This telegram gives a hint as to where the Commanding
General got the figure of 25,000 men quoted to General Shafter
in his wire of May 26th.

The Quartermaster-General gave more

detailed instructions, including some from General Miles, the
Commanding General.
• •• Your telegram regarding the carrying capacity of
these ships, according to Captain McRay's estimate, is a
little disappointing, as I hoped the vessels would carry
at least 30,000 men, infantry and artillery, with the
artillery horses. I understand that only one regiment of
cavalry is to go, and the Arkansas. Morgan. Breakwater. and
Stillwater have been fitted to carry that regiment, and
reported by General Scully [quartermaster at New Orleans]
as all ready. He reports that the oeizaba is only fitted
to carry 350 men. He has been directed to fit her up to
carry as many infantry men as can be conveniently put upon
her.
General Miles desires that all the vessels that arrive
in Tampa that are not fitted to carry troops, and were
heretofore arranged for ho~ses, should have temporary bunks
put up in the pens for stock, 80 that the largest number of
infantry and artillery P9ftaible can be taken over on the
first trip of the ships.

The problem of railroad lines and congestion of freight
has already been discussed.

The single line running from Tampa

to Port Tmnpa, supplemented by whatever transportation could be
found would be the means of moving the troops and their equipment onto the dock at Port Tampa.

The Army had laid down addi-

tional track on the dock itself, so that cars could be spotted
and loaded or unloaded from the ships.
The harbor at Port Tampa had a canal about half a mile
long, which was used for the loading of ships.
testified that the facilities were

~dequate

One expert later

for the loading of

twenty-four or twenty-five vessels with troops only and twelve
or thirteen with equipment only.

During the embarkation, the

facilities were used for twelve or thirteen vessels which were
loaded with both troops and equipment. 79
The pressure to sail had been building all through May,
with politicians wnnting immediate action at any cost.

By

June 4, communications were arriving from Washington hourly for
both Shafter and Miles, who had come down to Tampa to oversee
things in person.

Shafter responded to one telegram with the

statement, "Difficulties in loading cannot be appreciated,"
While IUles still si:ruck an opt:imistic note, saying, "Notwithstanding these difficulties, this expedition will soon be ready
to s8il."80

HOwever, by JUne 6, the people in Washington were

re&ching the breaking point, and Secretary of War Alger telegraphed that
Twenty thousand men ought to unload any number of cars and

assort contents. There is much criticism about delay of
expedition. Better leave a fast sbip to bring balance of
material needed than delay longer.
However, by this time General Shafter was able to report,
though not correctly, that the men were being loaded.

Actually

the loading did not begin until early in the morning of Tuesday,
JUne

7th.
Most of the secondary works available on the War state

that there was no plan devised for the loading at Tampa, that
regiments were simply told to go to the pier and get on the first
ship they saw, etc.

In fact., there was a plan which was de-

scribed to the Dodge Commission:
Question. • • as to troops, were the vessel upon Which the
several organizations were to embark indicated and the name
furnished to these severa) organizations, or did they go
ahead en masse?
Answer: It was indicated what vessels they should go on,
and the commanding 6§ficers had orders what vessels they
were to take. • • •
The evolution of this plan was also described to the
commission by Captain .McKay.

He had made an estimate of the

number of troops each ves.el would hold, and had forwarded this
estimate to Colonel Humphrey, who took it to General Shafter.
Shafter then issued orders to the commanders of the individual
units.

It may be that not all organizations received the orders

issued by Shafter, and this may be the point at which control of
the embarkation was lost.

But the fact remains that the plan

was made, and orders is.ued. 84
One of the men who contributed to the story about the
lack of plans for the embarkation was Lieutenant Colonel J. W.

Jacobs, who had been involved in the inspection of the transports.
Question: It was a sort of a haphazard operation?
Answer: I should say so, very decidedly, air.
Question: Had the transports on which the troops embarked
been previously inspected?
Answer: Yes, air, by General Lawton, Colonel Dorst, and
myself, we made one inspection.
Queetion: Were the transports, so far aa you know, sui table for the carrying of troops on such an expedition?
Answer: Yes, they were very good.
Question I What was the condition of them as to crowding?
Everything was carried that it could carry, I suppose.
Answer: I don't think there was any particular oveigrowding, considering the ahort distance they had to go.
Jacob's testimony elicited a furious telegram to the
Adjutant-General from Colonel Humphrey, then serving in CUba
with the Fifth Corps.

He

gives some more details on the opera-

tion of the plan of embarkation.
Jacob's evidence before commis8ion, if reported correctly
that embarkation of troops at Port '!'ampa was haphazard,
shows grossest ignorance or premeditated mi8representation.
My pencil memoranda made then and there shows that the
loading was done with deliberate care, General Shafter
having given me timely information of theagrder in which
organizations broke camp for embarkation.
EVen Jacobs had to admit, however, that Colonel Humphrey
was in personal charge of the loading might and day.

captain

McKay, who was acting as Humphrey' s assistant, gave more details
on the

~ole

of the activities during the loading.

Question I To What extent did you have charge of the loading of transports at Port Tampa?
Answers Well, I had the superintending of the loading of
stores--of the commissary stores, quartermaater stores,
wagons, mules, and artillery.
Question: In general, how were the stores loaded? Did eacll
transport go with a certain number of rations--or did you
put the bacon in one ship and the hardtack in another, and
the beef in another, etc?

Answer: Nearly every ship was loaded with the complete
rations.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Question: • • • were the ships overloaded?
Answer I • • • most of the Slhips had what they could comfortably carry, but I think there were five that were a
little overcrowded and a number were taken off and put on
others that were not crowded.
• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Question: Do you know. • • how the medical and quartermaster stores were loaded, were they loaded so that each
vessel's troops would have the supply of medical and
quartermaster's stores and commissary stores that they
would need when the landed?
Answer I 'l'hat is my impression. I don't think there was
an overabundance of medical stores aboard. I doubt if
there was any supply of medical atores outside of these
panniers to the best of my recollection.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
ouestion: • • • were the vessels comfortably fixed for the
transportation of the troops, had special efforts been made
to make them so?
Answer: Yes, sir, for the limited time they had. 'l'here
was a great hurry to get the expedition off. Every day-two or three times a day--a telegram would come for me
from Colonel Humphrey to hurry up m6tters as quickly aa
possible. If we hag7had more time, we probably could have
made things better.
It is a measure of the task facing the historian to compare the above teat.imony, made by a man who was present, with
what will follow, also testified t.o by men who were present.
Colonel Jacobs agrees with captain McKay on the fact that rations
were loaded on each vessel.

However, he states that the artil-

lery ammunition, guns, and other gear were loaded on different
ships, and medical supplies were not loaded throughout the fleet.
According to his testimony, no medical supplies were sent by
order of Colonel Humphrey, and no ambulances by order of General
Shafter.

COlonel Jacobs' statements regarding medical supplies
are supported by the testimony of Major valery Havard, the Chief
Surgeon of the cavalry Division of the Fifth Corps.

Major Havard

stated that he had brought enough supplies for two weeks operations, but complained that no ambulances were taken and that the
medical stores were scattered among the transports.

He said,

MX believe the transports were not properly loaded in the first
place,MSS

He recommended that in fu~ure operations, medical

supplies be loaded separately from those of the Quartermaster's
Department.
The problom, clreadl· confused, gets more so when the
statements of Major A. H. Appel, the officer in charge of the
hospital at Tampa, are considered.
enough medical supplies on one
bed hospital.

In

shi~,

He stated that he loaded
the Olivette. for a 200-

addition, he says he loaded six ambulances and

six escort wagons with their accompanying mule teams, as well. 89
About all that can be deduced about medical supplies is
that there were shortages which should not have existed.

The

SUrgeon-General stated, "When the command embarked on the transport vessels, the baggage wagons and mules were left behind and
were never seen again by the Medical Department of the Fifth
Army

Corps ... 90
The fact of great confusion on the docks at Port Tampa

has been recorded by history.

Whether it was due to poor plan-

ning on the part of Shafter and Humphrey, or whether they would
have done better if better organized to meet the problems,

cannot be said with certainty.

The results which flowed from

that embarkation were far-reaching, indeed.

When the whole

problem has been considered, the words of Secretary Alger still
have a certain measure of authority.
And, yet, notwithstanding the natural and inherent embarrassments attending the organizing, equipping and 9mbarkation of that Army, General Shafter was r~!dy to sail within
eight days after he received his orders.

CHAPTER V
COMMENTARY-RESULTS FLOWING
FROM THE EMBARKATION
Between May 18 and August 31, the port at Tampa and its
facilities had accomplished the following work:
Funds Disbursed • • • • • • • • • • • • $1,057,582.46
Army Corps equipped • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Freight cars handled (loaded or unloaded) •• 13,329
Officers and men transported • • • • •
• 66,478
Horses anc r·1ules transported • • • •
• • 15,306
Transportation requests issued. • • • • •• 1,610
Bills of lading issued • • • • • • •
• • • • 815
Horses and Mules received • • • • • • • • • • 11,389
Horses and Mules issued. • • • • • • •
• .9,919
Wagons "set up" • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 604
Teams "broken out
(6 miles) • • • •
• • • .141
Teams "broken out" (4 miles) • • • • • • • • • • 520
Pack trains equipped • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 21
~'lagons and ambulances repaired • • • • • • • • .699
Trannporta fitted out. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33 1
Transports cleared • • • • • • • •
• • • 78
H

In the process of doing all of these things, the men
operating the facilities stirred up a let of comment and controversy, both among themselves and in the press.

For example, the

Commissary-General of Subsistence thought that " •• .the Subsistence Department should purchase the food, convey it, and hand
it to the soldiers.

I do not thlnk in this country there will

be proper service until that is done.- 2
The Medical Department was also unhappy, particularly about the shipment of its supplies.

104

The Dodge Commission stated

that " • • • no small part of the troubles consequent upon lack of
supplies was due to the slowness with which such supplies were
transported and the failure to properly deliver, the responsibili ty for which rests upon the Quartermaster's Department." 3
The press was alive with criticism of the

Tampa

ernbarka-

tion, and the Army's inability to handle it in an orderly fashion.

Cries were heard on every side for all investigation so

that these mistakes might not be repeated.

The Dodge

COllUllission

was the result of these and other complaints concerning the War

Department.

Its investigation was thorough, and when it got

through, it 'Saio, among

oth~r

things, that,

• • • the divided authority and responsibility in the War
Departnumt has produced friction, for which in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. 4
A foreign officer pointed out the weaknesses of the op-

ation, and said " • • • a trained staff and officers could not be
improvised."

He felt that"

.the whole operation of embar-

kation at Tampa is full of lessons for our guidance.· S
A later writer felt that the solution to the problem
would have been a general staff.

His comment was, ·We are not

going to make any comments on the disorder and lack of organization, but we can safely say that with even a mediocre general
staff all this could have been avoided.· 6
The Dodge Commission report gives the other side of the
story, with a certain degree of compassion, recognizing that
planning was all that could be done by department heads.

The commission has refrained from criticizing certain of
the heads of bureaus for not having acted with foresight
in preparing their various departments for active war before war was actually declared, because it has appeared
that the national defense fund provided by the act of
March 9, 1898, was not made available for use, except by
the Navy and for coast defenses and the expenditures incident thereto, until after the declaration of war. 7
In particular, the Quartennaster's Department's problems
were recognized and comment made regarding them.
It will be observed that the declaration of war threw
upon the Quartermaster's Department an amount of labor and responsibility for which it was neither physically nor financially
prepared. 8
What were the recommended solutions? How were the problems which arose during the use of Tampa going to be solved?
The answer to both of these questions lies in a single word-change.
The Dodge Commission, having made a thorough investigation, had a good idea of the problems existing and the possible
changes which could be made.

One of the suggestions advanced

was that included in a small section entitled"Army Administration" in the last volume of the report.

It was advanced by a

Civil War veteran, Charles F. Benjamin, who had served on the
staff of Secretary Stanton.

Benjamin suggested that the general

staff be made open to the line of the Army, that is, to men not
members of the Technical Service Departments.

The only excep-

tion to this "open door" policy would be assignments to the Engineer, Signal and Medical Departments, each of which was

supposed to be so technical that special qualifications or training would be required.

In addition, he recommended that the En-

gineer and Signal Departments be consolidated, and that the
Quartermaster, Subsistence and Paymaster Departments be consolidated.

Finally, he said that the general staff should be placed

under the control of a chief of staff, rather than the then extant Commanding General, which office he described as "neither
fish nor fowl ng
A direct tie from the Tampa embarkation to the idea of a
general staff is established by the Dodge Conwission.

In dis-

cussing the lessons to be learned from the expedition, the commissions report states that one of them is that a strategic
staff is needed.

In sum, "There must be a central staff system

for futher conflicts, a logical and rapidly expanded network of
• and centralized a~thority."lO

supply,

The need for a strategic staff was echoed by the annual
report of th.e Secretary of War for 1898.

The Inspector General

stated that:
The great need in the Army to insure coherence, promptness, and efficiency in the field is a strategic staff,
composed of highly trained and trustworthy offices, such
as possessed by all continental armies, who, free from
the overwhelming details of paper work, can give their
wldivided attention to the systematic preparation and
execution of all important military affairs. Such a
staff would permit no symptom of chaos, hold all to their
full and proper work, and mold the organized forces and
control their movement so they would respond to the
slightest touch.ll
There are definite relations to the Tampa embarkation to

be seen here, too.

Remarks like hfree from the overwhelming de-

tails of paper work" and "control their movement" show a preoccupation with the simplification of staff work in the departments
particularly the Quartermaster's Department.

An influence which

will be of later significance is seen in the reference to the
general staffs of the continental armies.
The Inspector General was not without opposition in his
recommendations.

In the same report, only a few pages later,

the Adjutant General says that " • • • it is doubtful, if • • • a
general reorganization of the staff, or the adoption of new systems, will be

fo~nd

to be desirable, certainly nothing radical

should be entered upon • • • • 12

An

indication of the innate

conservatism of army bureaucrats is shown by the passage following the above quote, which says in effect, that if the staff
system was good enough for the Civil War, it is good enough for
1898.

The whole passage seems to show an ignorance of the prob-

lems which were part of the embarkation at Tampa.

Certainly a

new staff would not solve all of the problems, but the Tampa experience should have made the inadequacies of the old system manifest.
A survey of the annual reports of the Secretary of War
for 1898 and 1899 shows a host of changes in minor details which
reflect the experience of the Spanish-American War, and show the
preoccupation of most of the people involved with the problems
encountered.
As an example of the detail changes, one might take a

circular published ·by the Adjutant-General's Office on November
10, 1898.

This circular directed that cooks could now be enlist-

cd for the specific job of cooking, or would be paid at a special
rate. 13

This change represented something that successive

Commissary-generals had been trying to get through Congress for
twenty-five years before the War.
Other examples of detail changes may be found in additiona to the hospital corps manpower, particularly at the regimental level, provisions for regular sanitary inspections of
troops in camp, the adoption of a tropical uniform and tropical
rations. 14
A more specific note relating to Tampa is struck by the
Inspector General in discussing field transport for the year of
1898.

He refers to the "revolution

N

in army methods caused by

recent tropical experiences, and tho "competency and adaptability of officers and men to organize and handle the transportation
of an army, and the special knowledge required to do it. ,,15
The Quartermaster-General's Office was aware of the
changes which had taken place in the field of transportation, and
a new manual for the use of field quartermasters reflected these
changes in its organization.

It concentrated on the operation

of quartermaster depots, and the handling of all type of transportation. l6
The major changes which were to affect the War Department were taking shape.

The first step in the program of change

was the resignation of Secretary of

~lar

Alger.

McKinley had

been more and more unhappy with Alger's performance at the War
Department, but had hesitated to ask for his resignat.ion while
the public clamor over the war was going on.

When the Dodge Com-

mission, in effect, cleared Alger, the ",ray was open for his resignation, which was not obtainr,r', however I without a lot of man euvering on the part of l"lcKir: ley designed to placate the irasci-

ble Alger.
In July 1899, one of f.icKinley· s men, at the direction of
the President, made a telephone call to the summer horne of a
prominent New York la'i<!ycr.

When the man answered the phone, he

was told that tho President wanted him for the position of Secretary of War.

Elihu Root, the lawyer, responded with his thanks,

but said that he Knew nothing of the Army.

The reply carne back

that the President did not want a man who knew about the Army,
but for a lawyer to direct the administration of the newlyacquired Spanish islands.
in government service.

Root accepted, and began a long career

His first steps at the War Department

were marked by efficiency, for Root, though ignorant of the Army,
was a capable administrator.

loath the aid of a number of offi-

cers in the War Department, Root bent himself to the task of administering the Spanish islands.

In doing so, he of necessity

became familiar with the Army's system of administration, and its
staff operations.

In the course of his studies, he read the re-

port of the Dodge Commission, and discussed its findings with
General Dodge, a personal friend.

The recommendations of the

commission were reinforced by his reading of Emory Upton's works

on the military policy of the U. S.

They gave Root, as he put

it, " • • • the detail on which I could base recommendations and
overcame my ignorance as a civilian." 17 Upton's writings gave
Root the theory, and Tampa provided the impetus for the changes
he made.
Root felt that the permanent assignment to staff duties
which was then the rule in the Army was inefficient and productive of petty bureaucrats, more interested in building their own
little empires of political influence than in operating efficiently.

He felt that a permanent general staff, under the con-

trol of a chief of staff, would be the best way for the War Department to operate efficiently.

The chief obstacle in his path

was the Commanding General, Nelson A. Miles.

Miles, an old In-

dian fighter, did not want the office of Commanding General abolished, and it was on this point that he and Root crossed swords.
Miles had an ambition to be President, and the office of Commanding General would, he thought, serve as a good spring board. 18
Root's first attempt to carry out his ideas in 1902 was blocked
by Miles' opposition and use of his political influence and military prest i ge.

In fact, Root did not succeed in getting his

way until after Miles retired.

The retirement of Miles in Au-

gust of 1903 left the road for reform open, and only a week after it became effective, the Act of Congress which began the existence of the General Staff Corps went into effect.

Root's

was the product of over four years' work in molding opinion on
the problem.

He had worked on prominent editors through

recommending the works of Upton, which he had reprinted as a
government document, and on Congress through the annual reports.
A foreign diplomat once praised the annual report of the Secretary of War during Root's term of service as the best authority
on military affairs in the world.
The influences acting on Root were threefold: the work
of Upton, the recommendations of officers at the War Department
and Teddy Roosevelt, once he became president, and finally his
own study of the problem particularly the operations at

Ta~n1pa.

In assessing the amount of influence each of these three
forces had on Root, no simple solution presents itself.

Each

force did have an effect, and the fact that Root was subjected
to each force can be proved.

But the degree to which a particu-

lar idea influenced this man cannot be determined.

The best

that can be said is that Root was aware of the logistical problems, and understood what had caused them.

His actions in crea-

ting a general staff can be tied to Upton, or to the Spanish War
veterans, among them Roosevelt, but Tampa also exercised an influence.
But Upton's work was by no means the only influence acting on Root.

He" • • • could not have done it if it were not

for the popular interest aroused by the scandals of the Spanish
War • • • • ", according to his official biographer who had the
opportunity to check his statements with Root. 19

In addition

to his talks with General Dodge, he also spoke with General
Horace Porter and Adjutant-General corbin. 20

He also spoke to

some of the younger . officers of the Army, no doubt including veterans of the Spanish War, during his study of the problems of the
Army in general.

Among these younger officers was 1-1ajor vlilliam

H. Carter, who had also served under Upton, and who embodied the
ideas of Upton, as well as his experience in the Spanish War in
his document entitled »Creation of the American General Staff. n21
Root, as successor to Alger, received many communications about
Alger's errors, and in the course of investigating the errors, he
had to dig into the records of the Spanish War.

He could not

have escaped the influence of the War, and as he began to prepare to act, this influence shaped his method of approach.
Tampa created a climate of receptivity to the idea of
change in the Anny system, first in the public mind, and later,
in the minds of some members of Congress and the military hierarchy.

Superimposed on this climate was Root's personality, and

the other influences. 22
What conclusion may be drawn from this examination?
best, a limited one.

At

The military logistics of the Tampa opera-

tions had a definite effect on the creation of the General Staff
of the U. S. Army.

However, the degree of this effect cannot be

measured, and the existence of other known influences makes it
impossible to establish a direct causal relationship between Tampa and the General Staff.

Not all of the errors which occurred

at Tampa could have been prevented by a general staff, but, as
Secretary Root put it lithe real object of having an Army is to
prepare for war, It and the establishment of a general staff gave

the A.r my an organized group of planners to do just that.
The logistical operations at Tampa constitute an almost
forgotten phase in the military history of America.

Yet these

operations, maligned though they were, perhaps because of being
lnaligned, exercised a great influence on the course of American
military history.
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